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CRIMINAL JUSTICE COLLAPSE:
THE CONSTITUTION
AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA
BRANDON L. GARRETT†
TANIA TETLOW††
ABSTRACT
The New Orleans criminal justice system collapsed after Hurricane
Katrina, resulting in a constitutional crisis. Eight thousand people,
mostly indigent and charged with misdemeanors such as public
drunkenness or failure to pay traffic tickets, languished indefinitely in
state prisons. The court system shut its doors, the police department
fell into disarray, few prosecutors remained, and a handful of public
defenders could not meet with, much less represent, the thousands
detained. This dire situation persisted for many months, long after the
system should have been able to recover. We present a narrative of the
collapse of the New Orleans area criminal system after Hurricane
Katrina. Not only did this perfect storm illuminate how unprepared
our local criminal systems may remain for a severe natural disaster or
terrorist attack, but it raised unique and underexplored constitutional
questions. We argue that constitutional criminal procedure failed to
serve its protective role during this emergency, while deferential rules
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rooted in federalism had the unanticipated effect of hindering
provision of critical federal emergency assistance, and perhaps most
important, longstanding local neglect rendered the system vulnerable
to collapse. We conclude by imagining systems designed to safeguard
the provision of criminal justice during emergencies.

INTRODUCTION
Hurricane Katrina washed away the New Orleans criminal
justice system. As residents evacuated, the jail flooded to inmates’
chests and police scrambled to enforce order without any
communication. The water receded weeks later revealing “thousands
of detainees awaiting hearings and trials . . . thrust into a legal limbo
without courts, trials, or lawyers”1 resulting in what one judge called
“a ‘constitutional crisis.’”2 This dire situation lasted not just during the
initial period of severe disruption, but for upwards of a year. While
courts eventually reopened, they failed to act as eight thousand
people languished for months “doing Katrina time” in prisons. Most
were arrested for petty offenses such as public drunkenness, reading
tarot cards without a permit, or failure to pay traffic tickets, and then
detained based solely on a police affidavit. Most then served long past
their likely sentences without ever receiving a judicial hearing.3 Nor
did these thousands of detainees, mostly indigent, meet with lawyers.
Only six public defenders remained in New Orleans, which the Chief
Judge of the criminal court called “a full-blown disaster.”4 In effect,
Louisiana courts suspended habeas corpus for six months. The United
States has rarely experienced such a rapid and complete collapse of
local law enforcement, a district attorney’s office, the indigent defense
1. Peter Applebome & Jonathan D. Glater, Storm Leaves Legal System a Shambles, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A1.
2. Laura Parker, People arrested before Katrina still await trial, USA TODAY, Feb. 27,
2006, at A4; Morning Edition: Evacuated Prisoners Held in Limbo After Katrina (NPR radio
broadcast Oct. 25, 2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4973246&
ampsourceCode=RSS (last visited Sept. 12, 2006).
3. See Gwen Filosa, Katrina leaves inmates in limbo: Many still jailed are ‘doing Katrina
time,’ TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 18, 2006, at B1 (“[P]eople have been held after their release
dates, some of whom should have been out before Katrina.”); ACLU NATIONAL PRISON
PROJECT, ABANDONED AND ABUSED: ORLEANS PARISH PRISONERS IN THE WAKE OF
HURRICANE KATRINA 13 (Aug. 2006) [hereinafter ACLU REPORT], available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/prison/oppreport20060809.pdf (noting that 60 percent of inmates were
held on attachments, traffic violations or municipal charges).
4. Michael Perlstein, Public defender cases in limbo: Indigent program broken, judge says,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 11, 2006, at A1.
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system, jails, and criminal courts. A perfect storm illuminated how
unprepared a local criminal system may remain for a severe natural
disaster or terrorist attack.
The nearly unprecedented collapse of Louisiana criminal justice
institutions and the mass detentions that resulted raise unique
constitutional questions. We argue that constitutional criminal
procedure rules failed to serve their intended protective roles during
the emergency due to the institutional collapse of already vulnerable
local actors.5 Post-Katrina, criminal procedure rules failed to protect
individual rights or even ensure normalcy, while deferential doctrines
rooted in federalism hindered provision of critical federal emergency
assistance.
In Part I of this Article, we present a narrative of the collapse of
the New Orleans area criminal system after Hurricane Katrina. The
account is based on local news coverage and a series of interviews at
all levels of the New Orleans criminal system. We obtained first-hand
information from police officers, state and federal judges, the district
attorney, prosecutors, prisoners, prison officials, federal agents, and
defense lawyers. These actors describe unforeseen devastation, poor
planning, indifference and shock, heroic efforts, creative jerry-rigging,
but ultimately inadequate efforts to preserve a semblance of orderly
administration of justice. We describe how a police department was
left alone to try to enforce order. Courts set up temporary facilities
haphazardly (in a Greyhound bus station). Prosecutors remained
understaffed and in disarray. Prisoners arrested for minor violations
remained in poor conditions without hearings for upwards of six
months. The few local judges who tried to intervene faced an
indifferent state supreme court. While federal and state officials failed
to intervene, volunteers conducted an ad hoc operation to identify
thousands of prisoners and file motions for their release, but with

5. On how one defines an “emergency,” see Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1042 (2004). See also Oren Gross, “Once More unto the
Breach”: The Systemic Failure of Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to
Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 437, 438–39 (1998) (describing the term
emergency as “open-ended” and relative to the definition of normalcy). We use the term
“emergency” and not “natural disaster” given the significant role played in New Orleans by
non-natural faulty construction of levees and canals and because the same concerns would be
implicated in the event of a terrorist attack. For recent criticism of the role of federalism in
institutional failure after Katrina, see Stephen M. Griffin, Stop Federalism Before it Kills Again:
Reflections on Hurricane Katrina (Mar. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=894470.
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only a skeleton crew of six defense lawyers remaining to represent
them.
In Part II, we turn from what happened to the roles played by
constitutional criminal procedure and federalism during the collapse
of the New Orleans criminal system. The aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina presents a little-examined constitutional crisis. Scholars
typically examine the scope and role of constitutional rights during an
emergency given a scenario of executive aggrandizement of power at
6
the expense of individual rights. The opposite occurred after Katrina:
abdication of responsibility at all levels of government. Local officials
and institutions did not function and did not provide even a forum for
constitutional rights to be heard, much less vindicated. First, existing
criminal procedure rules remained ineffective in preventing mass
abuses—we catalogue the Bill of Rights provisions violated—but not

6. Scholarship regarding law during emergencies has focused on executive powers during
wartime and recently regarding the War on Terror. See, e.g., PAUL L. MURPHY, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES: 1918–1969, at 1 (1972) (“Confronted with the immediate crisis
of modern total war . . . Congress and the President were called upon to extend their
powers . . . .”); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
WARTIME 218 (1998) (“Without question the government’s authority to engage in conduct that
infringes civil liberty is greatest in time of declared war . . . .”); Ackerman, supra note 5, at 1029
(“After each successful [terrorist] attack, politicians will come up with repressive laws and
promise greater security . . . .”); David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the
War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 28–30 (2003) (“[T]he war on terrorism has
once again prompted calls for preventive justice . . . .”); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should
Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1023 (2003)
(“[D]emocratic governments must be careful not to fight terrorism with lawless means.”); Jules
Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1397–1421 (1989)
(“In a nuclear age dominated by two superpowers, frequent crises have been substituted for
direct military confrontation between two great power blocs.”); Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional
Law: Crisis Government Becomes the Norm, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 736, 741 (1978) (“[D]uring times
of all-out emergency, such as declared war, judges and legislators deferred to the Executive.”);
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 605
(2003) (“Events since September 11, 2001 have produced a new round of debate about law and
the emergency powers of government.”); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O. Gudridge, The AntiEmergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801, 1801 (2004) (“[T]alk of leaving the Constitution
behind . . . . was to be expected in the wake of September 11.”). While a few have studied the
effect of wartime emergencies on local criminal justice, they again focus on the problem of
executive overreaching and not institutional collapse. See Donald A. Dripps, Terror and
Tolerance: Criminal Justice for the New Age of Anxiety, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 30–42 (2003)
(examining possible transformation of criminal procedure rights during the war on terror);
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2138 (2002) (arguing that
the war on terrorism will affect domestic local law enforcement); William J. Stuntz, Terrorism,
Federalism, and Police Misconduct, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 665, 674–78 (2002) (arguing
that police misconduct may result from use of war on terror tactics in domestic law
enforcement).
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because they were inadequate or insufficiently flexible. Instead, with
local courts failing to hold hearings, prosecutors not making charging
decisions, and with a skeletal public defender’s office, procedure
rights had no practical significance. Second, the emergency sheds light
on how federalism and rules grounded in comity and deference to
state and local government can undermine the very institutions they
were designed to protect. In the initial period after the storm when
local institutions were most disabled, federal aid would have been
particularly crucial. Yet in the months after Katrina, statutes made it
difficult for the federal government to provide law enforcement with
logistical or financial assistance, while federal courts remained
reluctant to remedy constitutional violations.7
One reason may be the practical limitations of remedying preexisting structural deficiencies of local criminal justice actors. New
Orleans, like many other localities, for years failed to secure basic
criminal justice needs, particularly protections for the poor,
minorities, and vulnerable communities. As a result of this persistent
neglect, after Katrina, the system totally collapsed. For that reason,
long-run rehabilitation may now require concerted local, state and
federal efforts.
In Part III, we conclude by imagining a system for the emergency
provision of criminal justice that might begin to address the
limitations of our existing institutions.8 Just as it failed to secure the
levees, our government has ignored the vulnerability of criminal
justice systems during emergencies. Predictable chaos followed from
a lack of resources but also from a lack of coordination between
different levels of government. Given the dangers of emergencies,
from natural disasters to terrorist attacks, joint planning to secure
basic legitimate functioning of criminal justice is sorely needed. The
last time our country took a hard look at such questions was in the
wake of urban riots in 1967, when the Presidential Kerner

7. As discussed infra Part II.B.1, the federal executive branch has been granted a raft of
statutory emergency powers for other purposes under the Stafford Act, such as repairing
buildings. See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
5121–5206 (2000) (“[S]pecial measures, designed to assist the efforts of the affected States in
expediting the rendering of aid, assistance, and emergency services . . . are necessary.”). In the
criminal justice arena, little to no financial assistance has been made available. See infra notes
182–86 and accompanying text.
8. For a general discussion of system-wide approaches courts adopt in criminal law, see
Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=893552.
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Commission suggested a range of procedures and remedies to adapt
9
criminal justice institutions to domestic emergencies. We propose
similar planning in states, the creation of emergency courts, and new
collaboration regarding criminal justice emergency planning.
Democratic legitimacy and public safety counsel sound
administration of a criminal system during exigent circumstances.
Longstanding fractures in one local criminal justice system made that
impossible after Hurricane Katrina.
I. NEW ORLEANS CRIMINAL JUSTICE COLLAPSE
A. The New Orleans Criminal Justice System Before Katrina
Long before Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans criminal justice
system was troubled by high crime, poor funding, bad management,
and corruption. Commentator David Brooks described how the
Hurricane “wash[ed] away the surface of society, [and] expose[d] the
underlying power structures, the injustices, the patterns of corruption
and the unacknowledged inequalities.”10 Perhaps this is particularly
true with respect to local administration of criminal justice.
The criminal justice system in the New Orleans area was more
underfunded than typical in American cities. The district attorney’s
office could only afford to pay prosecutors about $30,000 a year to
11
12
start. Public defenders earned $29,000 a year. Louisiana is the only
state that funds public defenders through the unsteady income stream
of traffic tickets and court costs.13 In Orleans Parish, an office of thirty

9. See infra Part III.A. Urban riots in Detroit in July 1967, also resulted in prolonged
detentions of thousands. Comment, The Administration of Justice in the Wake of the Detroit
Civil Disorder of July 1967, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1544, 1544, 1629–30 (1968).
10. David Brooks, The Storm After the Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at A23. Nearly
100,000 of New Orleans’ residents had no means of transportation when it came time to
evacuate the city. Eric Lipton, Committee Focuses on Failure to Aid New Orleans’s Infirm, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A20.
11. Gwen Filosa, Report on DA’s office finds major problems; Subpar prosecution rates,
staff morale and turnover are cited, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 20, 2005, at A1.
12. See NICHOLAS L. CHIARKIS ET AL., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMMEDIATE AND
LONGER-TERM NEEDS OF THE NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM 8 (2006), available
at http://www.lajusticecoalition.org/doc/DOJ-Orleans-Parish-Study.pdf.
13. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 n.1 (La. 1993) (discussing LA. REV. STAT. §
15:146 (1993) (current version at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:146 (2005)), which establishes “a
mechanism for local funding of individual districts’ indigent defender systems” in Louisiana);
NAT’L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS’N, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF TRIAL LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN LOUISIANA 40 YEARS AFTER
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14
public defenders handled a docket of thousands of cases a year. A
decade of independent police chiefs rooted out flagrant corruption
from the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD), but officers
remained underpaid and citizen distrust and police brutality
complaints remained high.15
The demographics of New Orleans contributed to problems that
the criminal justice system faced. Issues of inequality remain
inextricably tied to the aftermath of Katrina, where Orleans Parish’s
pre-Hurricane population was 67 percent black, 28 percent below the
16
poverty line, and 22 percent without their own transportation. The
New Orleans poverty rate ranked the third highest of any major city
17
in the United States. Polls indicated that most Americans thought
the response to Katrina was inadequate, but two-thirds of blacks
thought race was a factor18; rapper Kanye West announced that
19
“George Bush doesn’t care about black people,” and President Bush
acknowledged the disproportionate impact of the Hurricane due to a
“legacy of inequality.”20

GIDEON 24–25 (2004) (Alabama, the only other state that relies on court cost revenues, does so
only as a small supplement to state funding.); see also infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
14. Perlstein, supra note 4.
15. New Orleans police officers were among “the most poorly paid in the country.” Dan
Baum, DELUGED: When Katrina hit, where were the police?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2006, at 50,
52.
16. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ORLEANS PARISH QUICK FACTS, http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/states/22/22071.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2006). By 2004, the city had a population of
about 450,000, of which 66 percent was African-American, 26 percent white, 3 percent Hispanic
and 2.5 percent Asian (including a large Vietnamese community). OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG
CONTROL POLICY, PROFILE OF DRUG INDICATORS 2 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.
whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/statelocal/la/lanewor.pdf.
17. Frederic Dimanche & Alenna Lepetic, New Orleans Tourism and Crime; A Case Study,
38 J. TRAVEL RES. 19, 19 (1999) (examining the effect of crime and poverty on tourism in New
Orleans); see also Christopher Drew, Courts’ Slow Recovery Begins at Train Station, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2005, at A22 (“[M]ore than one-quarter of the city’s 450,000 people liv[e] in
poverty.”).
18. A Pew Research Center poll showed that many more African Americans (85 percent)
than whites (63 percent) believed President Bush “could have done more to get relief efforts
going quickly.” PEW RESEARCH CTR., TWO-IN-THREE CRITICAL OF BUSH’S RELIEF EFFORTS:
HUGE RACIAL DIVIDE OVER KATRINA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 5 (2005), available at
http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/255.pdf.
19. See John M. Broder, Amid Criticism of Federal Efforts, Charges of Racism Are Lodged,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A9 (quoting Mr. West and detailing several claims that race played
a factor in the government’s response to Katrina).
20. See Michael A. Fletcher & Jonathan Weisman, Bush Says Spending Cuts Will Be
Needed, Tax Increase Not Part Of His Gulf Relief Plan, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2005, at A1
(reporting President Bush’s recognition of and vow to end “the legacy of racial discrimination
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New Orleans’ local government was not unaware of the dangers
21
of flooding and hurricane damage, and after a 2004 hurricane
created traffic deadlock, Louisiana officials developed elaborate
“contraflow” evacuation plans. However, the criminal justice system
and its constituent parts, already struggling, remained particularly
unprepared. The police department was never given proper supplies
for a flood, including boats, food, and water. Its hurricane
preparedness plan remained on a shelf and was never practiced.22 The
court system did not create redundancies in records. The evidence
room was in a basement. Prisons had no evacuation plans. Nor were
the courts prepared to resume business after an emergency.
B. The Storm
On Friday, August 26, 2005, Hurricane Katrina changed course
from its forecasted path, gathered enormous strength, and aimed at
New Orleans. Mayor Ray Nagin ordered the first mandatory
evacuation of the City’s half million citizens on Sunday morning,
August 28, 2005.23 Buses drove thousands to the Superdome, but the
City and State lacked an organized system to transport and shelter
residents outside of the city.24 The storm raged Sunday night and
Monday morning. Tens of thousands within the Superdome waited in
the dark as part of the roof tore off. Cell phone towers and power

and social inequality that has compounded poverty [in the Gulf Coast]”); see also Jack Shafer,
Lost in the Flood: Why no mention of race or class in TV’s Katrina coverage?, SLATE, Aug. 31,
2005, http://fray.slate.com/id/2124688/nav/tap2/gmail.com (last visited Aug. 19, 2006) (criticizing
cable news’ lack of attention to the race and class elements of Katrina’s aftermath).
21. For example, in July, Senator Mary Landrieu held a press conference “emphasiz[ing]
the importance of wetlands in the protection of New Orleans from hurricanes.” Children in life
preservers held up a blue tarp to show what fifteen feet of water would look like after a major
storm. Pupils go overboard to show coastal threat; Blue tarps simulate underwater Quarter,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 26, 2005, at 99.
22. See Baum, supra note 15, at 54 (stating that officers were never familiarized with the
elaborate hurricane plan and few who were interviewed even knew it existed).
23. See Jan Moller, Revised contraflow starts off smoothly; First use of new plan relatively
snarl-free, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 28, 2005, at A1 (reviewing the evacuation process under the
revised “contraflow” traffic plan); Posting of Gordon Russell to TIMES-PICAYUNE Breaking
News
Weblog,
http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_TimesPicayune/archives/2005_08.html (Aug. 28, 2005) (last visited Aug. 21, 2006) (detailing Mayor
Nagin’s evacuation orders). During Katrina, a record of up to one million people evacuated in
the two days before the storm. Pleading for Help; Bush Vows More Troops; Exodus Continues,
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 1, 2005, at A-1.
24. See Bruce Nolan, Katrina Takes Aim, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 28, 2005, at A1
(reporting the city’s plans to bus residents to the Superdome).
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lines fell, cutting off electricity and telephone communication for
25
hundreds of miles. By morning, however, city officials announced
that Katrina had inflicted serious wind damage but had largely spared
26
New Orleans. What Katrina’s turn spared, poorly designed levees
destroyed. On Monday, several canal levees, constructed by the Army
Corps of Engineers with design flaws, broke, inundating 80 percent of
27
the city. The waters rose past the ceilings of homes, forcing families
to cut through their roofs to breathe. Many of the weak, the elderly,
the sick, and the handicapped who remained did not survive.28 The
death toll in three states totaled 1,600, the vast majority from the New
29
Orleans area.
C. Abandoned Prisoners
We begin with the fate of Orleans Parish Prison (OPP), the city
jail big enough to be a “city within the city” and the seventh-largest
jail in the country.30 Nearly eight thousand prisoners were housed in
OPP during Hurricane Katrina, evacuated from the New Orleans
area in the next week, and then eventually transferred to thirty-four
facilities scattered across Louisiana.31 Of the thousands “lost in the
system” for months afterwards, most were indigent minorities, and
25. See Marc Caputo et al., Hurricane Katrina Killed At Least Five More People, Leveled
Numerous Building and Drove Hundreds to Their Rooftops to Escape Floods, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 30, 2005, at 1A (detailing the destruction in the aftermath of Katrina).
26. See Anonymous posting, Scenes From a Broken City, to TIMES-PICAYUNE Breaking
News
Weblog,
http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_TimesPicayune/archives/2005_08.html (Aug. 28, 2005, 22:30 CST) (last visited Aug. 21, 2006)
(detailing Katrina’s destruction).
27. See Bob Marshall et al., Report: Flood policy flawed, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 2, 2006, at
A1 (stating that after an eight month study, the Army Corps of Engineers admitted that the
New Orleans hurricane protection system was “a system in name only”).
28. See Shaila Dewan & Janet Roberts, Louisiana’s Deadly Storm Took Strong as Well as
the Helpless, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at A1 (analyzing Katrina’s death toll).
29. See id. (“[M]ore than 1,400 victims from along the Gulf Coast have been
counted . . . .”); Gwen Filosa, Storm victim’s body is found in Mid-City home; As death toll rises,
search teams continue efforts to find missing, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 28, 2006, at B1 (reporting
that the Louisiana death toll is at 1577 with around 300 people still missing); Sean Reilly,
Katrina medical response was chaos, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 29, 2006, at A1.
30. See Michael Perlstein, Prison became island of fear; Inmates and guards were in it
together, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 23, 2005, at A1; Henry Weinstein, 2,500 Arrested Before
Katrina Are Still in Limbo, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005, at A38 (“[A]bout 8,500 people being held
in the New Orleans jails were relocated.”); Interview with Marlin Gusman, Sheriff of Orleans
Parish, La., in New Orleans, La. (Mar. 13, 2006).
31. Paul Purpura, Inmates ordered released after months of waiting, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec.
23, 2005, at B3.
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some had already served longer while waiting for trial than they
would have if actually convicted. Few received a hearing or met with
counsel, and thousands remained in detention from months to a
32
year.
Orleans Parish Sheriff Marlin Gusman did not evacuate the
inmates before the storm, stating that he could never have convinced
33
other sheriffs to house his thousands of inmates. Instead the prison
conducted some very last minute preparation and planned on
34
“vertical evacuation” to higher floors if the city flooded.
Most of the inmates spending the storm in OPP were arrested for
minor offenses like criminal trespass, public drunkenness, failure to
pay traffic tickets, or disorderly conduct; many had not yet been
brought before a judge or charged, some had almost finished serving
35
their sentences, and others would only have been subject to a ticket.
For example, one inmate was charged for reading tarot cards without
a permit and was to have been released prior to August 29.36 The
prison also, however, housed hundreds of defendants charged with
37
rape and murder.
The large concrete buildings survived the storm itself well, but
not the levee break. Waters rose quickly on Monday night and ruined
38
the emergency generators. The prison lost lights and air circulation

32. Id.; Interview with Terry Alarcon, Judge, Orleans Parish Criminal Dist. Ct., in New
Orleans, La. (Mar. 13, 2006); ACLU REPORT, supra note 3.
33. Interview with Marlin Gusman, supra note 30. For criticism of Sheriff Gusman’s
decision see ACLU REPORT, supra note 3, at 19–27. The ACLU conducted an extensive
investigation of the conditions of OPP, interviewing more than a thousand prisoners.
34. Interview with Renee Lapeyrolerie, Spokesperson for New Orleans Criminal Sheriff
Marlin Gusman, in New Orleans, La. (Dec. 12, 2005); see also ACLU REPORT, supra note 3, at
19–27 (criticizing the inadequacies of the sheriff’s hurricane preparedness).
35. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, New Orleans: Prisoners Abandoned to
Floodwaters (Sept. 22, 2005), available at http://hrw.org/English/docs/2005/09/22/usdom11771.
htm.
36. Democracy Now: After the Hurricane: Where Have All the Prisoners Gone? More than
500 from New Orleans Jail Still Unaccounted For (Democracy Now radio broadcast Sept. 27,
2005) [hereinafter Democracy Now] (transcript available at http://www.democracynow.org/
article.pl?sid=05/09/27/1433256#transcript).
37. See Phyllis Mann, Hurricane Relief Aid, ADVOCATE (La. Ass’n of Criminal Def.
Lawyers,
Baton
Rouge,
La.),
Fall
2005,
at
3,
3,
available
at
www.lacdl.org/Newsletters/LACDLFall2005.pdf (noting the crimes of various jail residents).
38. Interview with Marlin Gusman, supra note 30. While the generators were located safely
above the waters, the fuel was on the first floor. Id.; see also Perlstein, supra note 30 (noting that
the jail was without power).
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39
(in ninety-degree weather); soon the sewage backed up as well. The
rising water filled the ground floor cells with chest-deep water, and
transformed the jail into an “island of fear and frustration.”40
Guards, required to stay during the storm, had brought their
families with them.41 Worried about their own children, they were
“not doing quite so much worrying about the safety of the people
42
locked inside the cells.” Electronic cells could not be opened and
food could not be safely distributed.43 Guards brought inmates to
44
higher floors, where they were crowded in with other prisoners.
“[T]he man who failed to pay his traffic ticket was shoulder to
shoulder with the man serving 20 years for manslaughter. They were
afraid of each other; they were afraid of dying; they were afraid no
one would ever come back for them.”45
Many deputies simply deserted; some deputies that remained
attempted to use force to keep prisoners in their flooded cells, though
some helped them break windows, because “[i]f you didn’t break the
46
windows, you didn’t breathe.” Prisoners signaled for help by setting
fire to blankets and shirts and hanging signs outside the windows
reading “We Need Help,” “Help Us,” and “One Man Down.”47
Despite early reports of deaths, all of the prisoners have been
48
accounted for. Several escaped, jumping over razor wire fences and
swimming through the floodwaters.49

39. Perlstein, supra note 30.
40. Id.
41. Mann, supra note 37, at 3.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 4.
45. Id.
46. Perlstein, supra note 30.
47. Id.; Press Release, Human Rights Watch, supra note 35.
48. Interview with Renee Lapeyrolerie, supra note 34.
49. See Michael Perlstein, Inmate says jail escape was ‘survival’; Fear of new charges keeps
him on the lam, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 23, 2005, at B1 (stating that an inmate wanted on
fugitive charges called the reporter from an undisclosed location to describe the necessity of his
decision to escape). Fourteen warrants were later issued for fugitives. Id. Some of these were
later located in custody, but eight had actually escaped and were recovered. Interview with
Marlin Gusman, supra note 30; see also Michael Perlstein, Fourteen escaped prison in Katrina
chaos, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 19, 2005, at A1 (detailing efforts to account for fourteen inmates
for whom fugitive arrest warrants were issued after Katrina). One of the fugitives was located
after he applied for FEMA benefits in his own name. Interview with Marlin Gusman, supra note
30.
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The next day, the Louisiana Department of Corrections arrived
with boats to carry prisoners to an elevated overpass on the nearby
interstate (where New Orleans residents rescued from their homes
50
also awaited transportation). Deputies parked buses as close as
floodwaters allowed, and ferried prisoners day and night to other jails
around the state.51
Most prisoners were brought to a staging area for processing, an
outdoor football field at the Elayn Hunt Correctional Facility in St.
Gabriel, Louisiana.52 The numbers at Hunt grew so large that guards
did not feel safe patrolling inside the gated field and retreated beyond
the fences.53 An inmate described, “[y]ou had to sleep on the wet
grass. They didn’t have anywhere we could urinate or defecate . . . we
didn’t have hot food. We didn’t have cold water. In fact, they come
once a day and throw peanut butter sandwiches over the gate. They
54
wouldn’t even come in the gate.” Men and women charged with
misdemeanors were mixed together with inmates facing felony and
capital murder charges, and violence resulted.55
New Orleans judges attempted to create makeshift court
hearings at Hunt, but could not meaningfully conduct hearings in the
absence of the inmates themselves (who were in a jumble), or their
lawyers (who were evacuated) or the public (who were not allowed
into the state prison).56 Although a few public defenders attended
these hearings, some private defense lawyers were turned away at the
57
gates of Hunt.

50. See Laura Maggi, Roundup of buses for storm bungled, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 6, 2005,
at A1 (noting that a number of people had gathered on Interstate 10 after the storm); Press
Release, Human Rights Watch, supra note 35 (criticizing the prison’s lack of an evacuation
plan); Telephone Interview with Phyllis Mann, Past President, La. Ass’n of Criminal Def.
Lawyers (Jan. 5, 2006); Interview with Burl Cain, Warden, La. State Penitentiary, in Angola, La.
(Jan. 23, 2006). Thousands of other citizens also were left to wait on the interstate for rescue,
including Professor Tetlow’s family.
51. Interview with Burl Cain, supra note 50.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Democracy Now, supra note 36.
55. Id.; Posting of Gwen Filosa, New Detention Center Opened, to TIMES-PICAYUNE
Breaking News Weblog, http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_
Times-Picayune/archives/2005_09_03.html (Sept. 3, 2005) (last visited Aug. 21, 2006); Interview
with Burl Cain, supra note 50; ACLU REPORT, supra note 3, at 74–76.
56. See Susan Finch, New Orleans courts carry on in Gonzales and Baton Rouge, TIMESPICAYUNE, Oct. 14, 2005, at B1 (reporting that judges were taking turns presiding at bond
hearings at Hunt); Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50.
57. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50.

04__GARRETT_TETLOW.DOC

2006]

CRIMINAL JUSTICE COLLAPSE

11/14/2006 8:38 AM

139

The Department of Corrections then housed inmates in prisons
58
and parish jails around the state. More than a thousand inmates,
including several hundred women, were moved to Angola, the state’s
59
maximum-security men’s prison. While grateful to have escaped the
hell of Orleans Parish Prison, evacuated prisoners faced a new
purgatory.60 For days and sometimes weeks, defendants were not
given access to telephones to find out whether their families had
61
survived the storm. Few would see lawyers. Many would end up
serving more than six months, far more than their sentences, or for
those with pending charges, more than their sentences could have
been if convicted.62
D. Emergency Law Enforcement
When the levees broke, the citizens outside of the jail walls were
left to their own devices for law enforcement as police officers
struggled to patrol and rescue with flooded vehicles and dead radios.63
“To those left in the city, it felt as if government at all levels had
vanished, as if not only New Orleans but the nation itself had
disappeared.”64 The NOPD lacked leadership. Police Chief Eddie
Compass was nowhere to be found in the first few days after the

58. Interview with Burl Cain, supra note 50.
59. See Gwen Filosa, Inmates fighting for their freedom, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 15, 2005, at
B1 (noting that ninety-four women moved from New Orleans to Angola had filed a suit seeking
their release); Penny Brown Roberts, 16 Female Prisoners Released from Angola, ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 23, 2005, at 11-A (stating that several women who were moved from
New Orleans prisons to Angola after Katrina were released following an order from a federal
judge). Angola’s population increased by 40 percent. John Corley et al., Worst case scenario:
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita change life as we know it, ANGOLITE, Sept./Oct. 2005, at 17, 18
(THE ANGOLITE is the award-winning magazine published by inmates at Angola Prison).
60. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50; Interview with Burl Cain, supra note 50.
Inmates brought to facilities other than Angola continued to face brutal treatment, including
racial epithets and beatings from guards. ACLU REPORT, supra note 3, at 82–85. The Louisiana
Department of Corrections housed inmates at a private jail facility in Jena, Louisiana, which
had previously been closed because of brutality allegations. Inmates reported particularly
egregious violence there. Id.
61. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50; Interview with Nick Trenticosta, Criminal
Defense Attorney, in New Orleans, La. (Dec. 12, 2005). Angola Penitentiary, where inmates
reported far better treatment, was an exception. ACLU REPORT, supra note 3, at 85.
62. Interview with Nick Trenticosta, supra note 61.
63. See Michael Perlstein & Trymaine Lee, The Good and the Bad, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec.
18, 2005, at A1 (detailing the obstacles the police force faced in providing law enforcement after
Katrina).
64. Baum, supra note 15, at 58.
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65
storm and soon resigned citing personal problems. Among the rank
and file, though most officers struggled bravely to do their jobs under
impossible circumstances, more than two hundred officers left under
66
the pressure, and two officers killed themselves. During the storm,
flying debris knocked out police radios and thus the chain of
command; groups of officers functioned under their own orders.67
District commanders learned how to “beg, borrow and acquire” to
feed their officers, getting socks, underwear and food for them (with
permission) from a Wal-Mart.68 Most police stations and vehicles
flooded, so officers commandeered boats and siphoned gas from
69
parked cars. They cleared blocked streets with chainsaws and
bulldozers, and evacuated patients from hospitals.70 They managed to
71
rescue thousands, with little outside assistance. They slept in police
stations or in requisitioned buildings until receiving housing on a
cruise ship named “Ecstasy.”72
While the NOPD remained in disarray, local officials and the
national media reported violence, murders, and rapes (including of
babies).73 The level of violence in pre-Katrina New Orleans made it

65. See id. at 55, 59 (noting that Compass was nearly invisible during the first three days of
the crisis).
66. Perlstein & Lee, supra note 63, at A1. Five days after the storm, Officer Lawrence
Celestine cried that he did not know whether his family was alive and felt betrayed by officers
who abandoned them; a few hours later, he shot himself dead in front of fellow officers. See
Telephone Interview with Ray Connor, Agent, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF), and former New Orleans Police Officer (Dec. 20, 2005) (Connor spoke to
Celestine shortly before his suicide); see also Trymaine Lee, District struggles to come to terms
with officer’s suicide, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 18, 2005, at A28 (detailing the suicide of Officer
Celestine). The next day, police spokesman Officer Paul Accardo killed himself. See Interview
with Ray Connor, supra.
67. Perlstein & Lee, supra note 63.
68. Id.
69. Baum, supra note 15, at 54–55; Michael Perlstein, Undercover officers embark on new
mission: search and rescue, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 18, 2005, at A1.
70. Michael Perlstein, Uptown heroics overshadowed by number of officers gone AWOL,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 18, 2005, at A1.
71. See Baum, supra note 15, at 57 (describing the police force’s struggle to rescue storm
victims with little outside help); Perlstein & Lee, supra note 63 (noting the resourcefulness of
the police in helping citizens after the storm).
72. Baum, supra note 15, at 62; Trymaine Lee, After securing Algiers, officers throw a
lifeline to fellow cops, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 18, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Lee, Officers throw a
lifeline]; Trymaine Lee, Stranded but still standing, officers rescue 9th Ward neighbors, TIMESPICAYUNE, Dec. 18, 2005, at A1; Walt Philbin, Housing sorely needed, cops say; Cruise ship
living is about to sail away, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 16, 2006, at A1.
73. After the Flood, The Hard Truths: Sharks in Canal Street? Snipers on Rooftops? Terror
in the Superdome?, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 15, 2005, at 28 [hereinafter After the Flood].
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easier for local public officials and citizens to believe these rumors
74
and to pass them on, but in total, only four murders have been
confirmed during the week after Katrina, a typical week in a city that
75
anticipated more than 200 homicides in 2005. Still, fear of violence
was significant, as it delayed help to those waiting on roofs.76
Looting occurred, particularly in downtown stores, making
additional law enforcement and arrests necessary under emergency
77
conditions. The day after the storm, looters at a gas station shot a
78
police officer in the head. Officers shot eleven people during the
week after the storm; four died.79 In the meantime, civilians “tried to
weave their own safety net.”80 Several law enforcement witnesses
reported that citizens beat up a man after he attempted a sexual
81
82
assault of a young girl. Many began carrying firearms. Residents of
one of the city’s most exclusive gated communities hired armed
83
Israeli mercenaries to guard their mansions. Citizens also created

74. See Michael Lewis, Wading Toward Home, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005 (Magazine), at 44
(detailing some of the rumors and fears floating around New Orleans after the storm); Robert
Pierre & Ann Gerhart, News of Pandemonium May Have Slowed Aid, WASH. POST, Oct. 5,
2005, at A8 (reporting that some officials believe that exaggerations of mayhem slowed the
response to the disaster).
75. See Brian Thevenot & Gordon Russell, RAPE. MURDER. GUNFIGHTS., TIMESPICAYUNE, Sept. 26, 2005, at A1 (noting that there were no murders at the Superdome, and one
at the Convention Center, which lacked meaningful security).
76. Id.; Pierre & Gerhart, supra note 74; see also After the Flood, supra note 73 (“If the
dome and the Convention Centre had harboured large numbers of middle-class white people, it
would not have been a fertile ground for his kind of rumour-mongering.” (quoting James
Amoss, Rita’s Aftermath; Katrina Takes Toll on Truth, News Accuracy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2005, at A16)).
77. See Jed Horne, Help Us, Please; After the disaster, chaos and lawlessness rule the streets,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 2, 2005, at A1 (“The focused police work had not been enough to
shield all French Quarter shops from the looters . . . .”).
78. Lee, Officers throw a lifeline, supra note 72.
79. See Perlstein & Lee, supra note 63 (“[T]he department also is reviewing . . . police
shootings in which four people were killed and seven injured . . . .”).
80. Baum, supra note 15, at 59.
81. Thevenot & Russell, supra note 75.
82. See Baum, supra note 15, at 59–60 (relating that nearly every white New Orleanian
Baum met was armed; he feared racial violence). Weapon sales in surrounding areas soared.
See, e.g., Paul Rioux, Firearm sales are booming since Katrina; Chaos after storm has fueled fears,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 19, 2006, at B1.
83. See Jamie Wilson, Mercenaries Guard Homes of the Rich in New Orleans, GUARDIAN
(London), Sept. 12, 2005, at 22 (“Hundreds of mercenaries have descended on New Orleans to
guard the property of the city’s millionaires from looters.”).
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their own rescue efforts, commandeering boats and vehicles to rescue
84
people from roofs.
By the Thursday after the storm, federal law enforcement agents
(especially from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)) came
85
to assist the NOPD patrol. Agents brought crucial supplies,
including ammunition and law enforcement t-shirts for officers
without uniforms.86
A remarkable political battle between the governor of Louisiana
and President Bush delayed by a week the arrival of federal military
troops for rescue operations and to establish order.87 Most of the
Louisiana National Guard was serving in Iraq, due back weeks after
Hurricane Katrina hit.88 The day the storm hit, Governor Blanco
89
asked President Bush for Guard assistance. The White House
informed Blanco that it would not send troops unless she would agree
to the federalization of her National Guard.90 Commanders of the
Louisiana National Guard and other state guards advised Blanco not
to agree because the Guard would then be prohibited by the Posse

84. See Baum, supra note 15, at 59 (“A casting director and a tax attorney . . .
commandeered a waterskiing boat to . . . rescue people from roofs and attics.”). A local
businessman used a fire truck (which he owned for Mardi Gras parading purposes) to ferry
paramedics around Lakeview. Interview with Scott Sewell, Owner of Sewell Cadillac, in New
Orleans, La. (Nov. 2, 2005).
85. Interview with anonymous DEA agent (Jan. 10, 2006); Telephone Interview with
Daniel Hebert, Agent, ATF, in New Orleans, La. (Jan. 12, 2006). Indeed, agents sometimes
ignored orders to focus on law enforcement and instead rescued people with their boats. Id.
86. Interview with anonymous DEA agent, supra note 85; Interview with Charles Smith,
Agent, ATF, in New Orleans, La. (Oct. 24, 2005).
87. See Robert Travis Scott, Politics delayed troop dispatch to N.O.; Blanco resisted Bush
leadership proposal, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 11, 2005, at A1 (“[T]he question for many people is
why it took President Bush five days to order the 82nd [Army Airborne] on the ground . . . .
[D]ocuments show that the White House delayed its decision to deploy federal troops while it
pressured . . . Blanco to accept the president’s hand-picked commander . . . .”); Interview with
Robert Mann, Commc’ns Dir. for Governor Blanco, in Baton Rouge, La. (Nov. 30, 2005). In
contrast, other governors sent National Guard members within days, creating the largest
coordinated, multi-state mobilization of guardsmen in U.S. history. Id. The Coast Guard,
already stationed locally, became the most effective rescue unit, saving more than thirty-three
thousand with their fleet of boats and helicopters. Paul Purpura, Coast Guard stands up well to
its biggest task: Unprecedented rescues draw praise, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 2, 2005, at A1.
88. Scott, supra note 87; see Scott Shane & Thom Shanker, When Storm Hit, National
Guard Was Deluged Too, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at A1 (“Guard commanders . . . blame in
part . . . the deployment to Iraq of 3,200 Louisiana guardsmen.”).
89. See Scott, supra note 87 (“On the day Katrina hit, Blanco told the president by phone,
‘We need everything you’ve got,’ according to the governor’s overview.”).
90. Id.
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91
Comitatus Act from conducting law enforcement, and because the
governor would lose all control over the operation.92 Blanco refused
the request for federalization, and a few minutes later President Bush
93
announced anyway that he would send federal troops.
Those troops helped rescue people who remained trapped on
their roofs after five days, and began recovering bodies of those who
had perished in the storm and its aftermath. Soldiers provided less
help with law enforcement. People soon learned that the soldiers
94
carried unloaded rifles. Prohibited by the Posse Comitatus from
making arrests, soldiers had no law enforcement training and
sometimes, together with FEMA, merely hindered local law
95
enforcement.
After the floodwaters receded, police officers, federal agents,
and troops patrolled the city and settled into a posture of undeclared
96
martial law. On Tuesday, September 6, the Mayor ordered a
mandatory evacuation of remaining citizens.97 Military checkpoints
stopped every passing car at major intersections checking for

91. See Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000) (prohibiting the use of armed forces
to “execute the laws”).
92. See Scott supra note 87 (“Documents and interviews show that Blanco wanted to avoid
conceding her authority . . . .”). The governor also wondered whether the White House was
seeking political advantage by seizing control of the Guard. Sources within the White House
indicated that they planned to blame Blanco for the delay in federal troops because she refused
to accede to the president’s ultimatum about federalizing the Guard. Id.
93. See Manuel Roig-Franzia & Spencer Hsu, Many Evacuated, but Thousands Still
Waiting; White House Shifts Blame to State and Local Officials, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at
A1 (“President Bush authorized the dispatch of 7,200 active-duty ground troops . . . . Shortly
before midnight Friday, the Bush administration . . . [had] ask[ed] her [Governor Blanco] to
request a federal takeover . . . .”).
94. See Interview with Daniel Hebert, supra note 85.
95. See Eric Lipton et al., Storm and Crisis: Government Assistance; Breakdowns Marked
Path From Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 1.1 (“[T]he federal government
failed . . . to face domestic threats as a unified, seamless force. Instead, the crisis in New Orleans
deepened because of . . . hesitant federal officials and besieged local authorities . . . .”).
Regarding Posse Comitatus, see infra notes 217–20. The military is largely untrained in police
work. “They were good people, but a lot of them were used to using computer guided rockets to
blow things up from miles away.” Interview with anonymous DEA agent, supra note 85.
96. See Baum, supra note 15, at 60 (“The phrase on the lips of the guest enforcers was
‘martial law.’”). Other local law enforcement officers came from around the country to help. In
particular, because New Orleans departments were among the first responders after September
11, New York’s departments were eager to reciprocate. See Al Baker, In New Orleans, Pausing
to Remember, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, at B4 (“The team’s work is not only a tangible way to
pay back the New Orleans Fire Department, which rushed some of its firefighters to New York
City four years ago, but a benchmark for how far the New York department has come . . . .”).
97. Baum, supra note 15, at 60.
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98
identification and the permission slips required to be in the city. The
99
City reopened to citizens on September 30, but a nighttime curfew
remained in place through December. Until late February, Louisiana
National Guardsmen patrolled New Orleans in humvees, with M-16s
and flack-jackets.100 Meanwhile, the evacuation resulted in a
precipitous drop in the crime rate in New Orleans for the next six
101
months.

E. “Camp Greyhound”: Jerry-Rigging a Judicial System
Immediately after the storm, the NOPD realized they could not
make arrests without a jail, so officers simply released the people they
apprehended.102 Within a week, however, the state Department of
Corrections set up a temporary jail in a Greyhound bus station and
train terminal, using electrical power from a locomotive.103 Inmate
“trustees” from Angola prison built the jail out of chain-link fences
with a bus canopy for a roof; each cell contained a portable toilet and
inmates slept on the ground.104
98. Residents became creative about manufacturing permission slips or official
identifications. See Day to Day: Katie Lasky Discusses Going Home, With or Without
Permission (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 16, 2005).
99. See Bruce Hamilton, Hobbled city opens doors to some; There won’t be much to eat,
drink or do, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 30, 2005, at Hurricane Katrina: Special Coverage
(“[R]esidents return to New Orleans today, one month after Hurricane Katrina . . . . Residents
who live in the reopened zip codes can enter the city at 8 a.m.”).
100. See Guard stands down from hurricane duty, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 19, 2006, at A18
(“The last of the Louisiana National Guard troops mobilized for Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita . . . were released from active duty in late February . . . .”).
101. See Adam Nossiter, New Orleans Crime Swept Away, With Most of the People, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at A18 (“New Orleans, the nation’s most dangerous city, has suddenly
become perhaps its safest, and what had easily been the country’s murder capital now has a
murder rate of exactly zero.”). New Orleans crime may have shifted elsewhere. See Trymaine
Lee, Evacuee-packed Houston sees jump in crime; 9 of 122 killings tied to people from N.O.,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 2, 2006, at B1 (“[O]fficials [in Houston] say the city has found itself
under the gun, with an escalating murder rate . . . .”).
102. See Baum, supra note 15, at 57 (“One captain told me that when his officers caught
looters they photographed them with their booty and turned them loose, hoping to arrest them
later on a warrant.”).
103. Gwen Filosa, Looting suspects stationed at Greyhound terminal, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct.
9, 2005, at A8; see also Reuters, Bus Line Upset With ‘Camp Greyhound’ Jail Name,
MSNBC.COM, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9324415 (last visited Aug. 21, 2005)
(“The Greyhound bus station in New Orleans was converted into a makeshift jail . . . .”).
104. See Drew, supra note 17 (“Inmates are held in chain-link pens . . . under a canopy
where the buses once pulled up. Each cell has a portable toilet, like those at construction
sites.”). Warden Cain turned over cash kept in Greyhound’s safe to the company, using his
trustees to crack the safe. Interview with Burl Cain, supra note 50.
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Though crime rates fell with the population evacuated, between
August 30 and September 8, 2005, more than two hundred arrests
105
were made. Most of those, 178, were for looting; 26 for possession
of stolen vehicles; 20 for resisting arrest; 14 for theft; and 9 for
106
attempted murder. A few were arrested for misdemeanors such as
disturbing the peace.107 According to the warden, the first prisoner
housed there “drove up in a stolen Enterprise rental car to buy a bus
108
Assistant District Attorneys for Orleans Parish and
ticket.”
Assistant U.S. Attorneys manned a desk in the lobby of the bus
109
station, working from the “Taste of New Orleans Gift Shop,” and a
magistrate held bond hearings.110
For its two-month life, the makeshift criminal court facility did
not follow rules of open proceedings, instead “barring family and
111
friends and allowing only arrestees and counsel in the courtroom.”
Most days, inmates were bused to true bond hearings in state or
112
federal court outside of New Orleans. Local judges then set bonds
too high for many indigent defendants to pay, rather than release
defendants back into the city or provide transportation to where their
families had evacuated. Large numbers of prisoners simply accepted
guilty pleas for misdemeanors and were then released.113
F. The Judicial Response
After the storm, the court system first faced the major logistical
problems of lacking a physical plant and communications. Judges,
105. See Filosa, supra note 103 (“In the past week, 155 came from the Jefferson Parish
Sheriff’s Office; 39 were nabbed by Kenner police. New Orleans brought in 17 . . . .”).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. (“Orleans Parish District Attorney Eddie Jordan’s office has a designated work
space, as does U.S. Attorney Jim Letten’s.”); Drew, supra note 17 (“The prosecutor hustles up
from his office—aka the Taste of New Orleans gift shop . . . .”).
110. See Finch, supra note 56 (“Magistrate Gerard Hansen has relocated to the Union
Passenger Terminal, which has served as a makeshift criminal justice center . . . .”).
111. Press Release, ACLU of La., Orleans Parish Deputy Attempts to Boot ACLU Staff
Attorney from New Orleans Criminal Court Room; ACLU Calls for Open, Public Court
Proceedings
(Oct.
12,
2005),
available
at
http://www.laaclu.org/News/2005/
Oct12OPPProceedings.htm; see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581
(1980) (“Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be
open to the public.”).
112. Id.; Telephone Interview with Greg Kennedy, Assistant U.S. Attorney, E. Dist. of La.
(Jan. 15, 2006).
113. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50.
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prosecutors, defense attorneys and their staffs evacuated over a
weekend, without any opportunity to discuss logistics, and scattered
114
115
over several states. These officials became unreachable for weeks.
The court complex flooded, damaging police headquarters, public
defender, district attorney, and clerk of court offices, and coroner and
evidence rooms.116 The Louisiana Supreme Court building (also
housing the intermediate court of appeal) was located in New
Orleans, and although it did not flood, the city itself was inaccessible
for a month. The federal district court and U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit were forced to relocate, to Baton Rouge and
Houston, respectively.117
The state criminal court now faced problems that included
suspended funding for prosecutors and public defenders, prisoners
118
scattered around the state, about half of the private defense bar
119
120
121
gone, a flooded evidence room, no jury pool, and a docket of
122
thousands of pending cases. New Orleans criminal court judges took
turns sitting at Hunt and the Greyhound jail until December when
123
they borrowed courtrooms in the federal courthouse. Their own
124
courthouse did not reopen until June 1, 2006.

114. See Interview with Judge Alarcon, supra note 32.
115. See Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50.
116. See, e.g., Susan Finch, Orleans judge holds court in Gonzales, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept.
26, 2005, at A2 (“Katrina’s floodwaters invaded most of the first floor of [Orleans Parish district
attorney’s] office building . . . [with] reports of flooding in some of the evidence rooms . . . .”).
117. See Pamela MacLean, A Tale of Disaster and Two Courts; U.S. Courts Open, La.
Courts Struggle, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 7, 2005, at 1 (“[J]udges in U.S. District Court in New Orleans
have returned to the old court . . . . [T]he 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals . . . [has a] new
temporary headquarters in Houston.”). Chief Judge Ginger Berrigan of the federal district court
suspended speedy trial deadlines for three months, modeling her order after a September 11,
2001, order issued by the Southern District of New York; ultimately, federal court reopened
more quickly than that. See Interview with Helen G. Berrigan, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for
the E. Dist. of La., in New Orleans, La. (Dec. 11, 2005).
118. See Michael Perlstein, Charge suspects or free them, DA urged, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov.
9, 2005, at A1 (“[I]nmates . . . remain spread among various state prisons . . . .”).
119. MacLean, supra note 117 (noting that half of the defense bar is gone).
120. See Perlstein, supra note 118 (“The police evidence room . . . [was] underwater for
several days.”).
121. Finch, supra note 56 (reporting that the jury pool had scattered around the country).
122. Perlstein, supra note 118.
123. See Interview with Judge Alarcon, supra note 32; Interview with Chief Judge Berrigan,
supra note 117.
124. Gwen Filosa, Court set to reopen today; Trials resume Monday at Tulane and Broad,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 1, 2006, at B1.
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The district attorney’s office lost much of its funding when the
tax base of the city collapsed, and laid off dozens of staff, including all
125
investigators, and could not pay its phone bill. For months,
prosecutors worked from home and at three tables in a downtown
126
hotel. From December 2005 until May 2006, the office moved into a
nightclub where lawyers worked at tables under disco balls.127
Witnesses had scattered around the country and the evidence vault, in
128
a basement, was underwater for several days.
The public defender’s office faced still greater adversity,
eventually laying off twenty-five of its thirty-five attorneys for budget
129
reasons. The funding for the office, which had recently been
130
criticized by the state Supreme Court as constitutionally inadequate,
131
was based primarily on traffic tickets.
With the population
evacuated, “‘[n]o tickets, no money.’”132 Accordingly, the few public
defenders still on the job have struggled to represent those arrested
post-Katrina, and have not even attempted to meet with the
thousands detained from before Katrina.133
In the absence of courthouses, venue and local jury pools, the
state supreme court declared a “court holiday” until October 25.134 It

125. See Associated Press, Katrina Still Threatens 3,000 New Orleans Court Cases, USA
TODAY, Oct. 30, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news.nation.2005-10-30-katrina-courts_x.htm
(last visited Aug. 21, 2006) (reporting that the D.A.’s phone shut off when the phone bill was
not paid); Susan Finch, Civil, criminal courts face funding crisis; Orleans DA cuts nonessential
staff, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 8, 2005, at B4 (contending that the city is responsible for one-third
of the D.A. budget, and not paying); Susan Finch, supra note 116 (reporting that the district
attorney laid off fifty-four employees after receiving no money from city); Interview with Eddie
Jordan, District Attorney of Orleans Parish, in New Orleans, La. (Dec. 12, 2005).
126. See Frank Donze, Study says city should weigh bankruptcy, Municipal government,
schools described as near insolvency, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 6, 2006, at A1; Interview with
Eddie Jordan, supra note 125; Filosa, supra note 124.
127. See Interview with Eddie Jordan, supra note 125.
128. Id.; Perlstein, supra note 118. While juries might accept a rusty gun or moldy plank as
evidence, the clerk of court noted that “[c]ocaine doesn’t hold up very well in water.” Id.
129. Paul Purpura, Cupboard bare for poor’s legal aid, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 2, 2005, at
B1.
130. See State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, 336–39 (La. 2005) (criticizing the deficiencies in
public defender funding, but requiring proof of insufficiency in individual cases).
131. See MacLean, supra note 117 (“Each judicial district pays its own [defenders] through
collection of court costs, usually traffic tickets.”); Interview with Nick Trenticosta, supra note
61.
132. MacLean, supra note 117 (quoting Phyllis Mann, past president of the Louisiana
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
133. See Perlstein, supra note 118.
134. Id.
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did nothing else to assist the court system. On September 6, Governor
Kathleen Blanco issued an executive order declaring that because
hurricanes Katrina and Rita had disrupted communications, rendered
courthouses inoperable, and caused “destruction and disruption of
services and infrastructure to our system of justice,” all deadlines in
legal proceedings would be suspended for thirty days.135
Due to this institutional collapse, of the approximately 8,000
inmates transferred from New Orleans throughout the state of
Louisiana, thousands served illegal sentences, thousands were
released only after six months, and thousands still faced charges but
have yet to see a lawyer in more than six months, and many still had
not seen a lawyer a year after Katrina struck.136
Normally prisoners arrested for misdemeanors, as most of the
8,000 were, would have been released after forty-five days, “unless
they had an outstanding warrant or a probation or parole hold,” but
“without paperwork, a judge, a prosecutor and a defense lawyer,” no
137
such hearings were held after the aborted effort at Hunt. Thus,
these prisoners were not released, received no hearing, and had not
seen a lawyer, much less a judge, for many months after the storm.
A handful of criminal defense lawyers did respond immediately
after the storm. Phyllis Mann, a former president of the Louisiana
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, heard that prisoners from
the New Orleans area were landing in jails around the state, so she
sent out an appeal to defense lawyers to call their local sheriff and get
a list of inmates.138 Sheriffs could provide no proper records for these
inmates, because “they just poured out of those flooded jails.”139
Jailers tried to sort out inmates and house them under enormous
logistical difficulties, but inmates’ medical records did not follow
them, and psychiatric patients did not receive their medications.140
135. See Exec. Order No. KBB 2005-32 (2005) (“All deadlines in legal proceedings . . . are
hereby suspended until at least September 25 . . . .”). Exec. Order No. KBB 2005-67, issued on
October 19, then asks that the Louisiana Legislature meet to address these issues. See Exec.
Order No. KBB 2005-67 (2005) (“[I]t has been announced that the Louisiana Legislature will be
called into a special session . . . for legislative action on these issues . . . .”).
136. See Filosa, supra note 3 (“The [volunteer] law students have seen cases in which people
have been held after their release dates . . . . Some have been held seven months longer than
what the law allows.”); Purpura, supra note 31 (“[M]ore than 8,000 inmates held in New
Orleans-area parish jails were evacuated to 34 . . . correctional facilities in Louisiana.”).
137. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. ACLU REPORT, supra note 3, at 77.
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Ultimately, Mann produced a questionnaire for inmates asking
141
for their lawyer’s names and pending court dates. With the help of
local sheriffs, she compiled a list and created a website listing inmates
142
Mann and other volunteers interviewed
and their locations.
thousands of defendants to let them know that someone knew that
they were there, to try to tell their families they were alive, and to
143
contact their attorneys.
This ad hoc team of volunteers discovered that defendants fell
into several categories. Some had already completed their sentences
or had served more time than they could have received had they been
144
convicted. Some were incarcerated on minor charges, but had never
received bond consideration or had been unable to post bond before
145
the storm. Some had never received counsel at all because they had
been recently arrested before the storm.146 Finally, some were serving
147
sentences or pending trial on more serious charges.
Criminal defense lawyers planned to file habeas petitions to
release several categories of prisoners that they assumed the system
would be happy to release: those who had served their time and those
awaiting trial on petty misdemeanors who could be given a
148
summons. Within two weeks, a New Orleans Municipal Court judge
signed release orders in the municipal misdemeanor cases, but the
other cases met resistance.149 Mann and others filed habeas petitions
in districts around the state where the prisoners were located and
150
where venue lay, thus thoroughly annoying rural local judges. They
141. Id.
142. The jails had rules requiring that lawyers visiting clients be members of the Louisiana
bar. Mann negotiated exceptions to the rule requiring (a) that lawyers be visiting their own
individual clients and (b) that the jail confirm bar membership with the Louisiana bar
association, whose office was located in New Orleans and was closed. Mann was allowed to
interview all evacuated prisoners, none of whom were her “clients,” but could only bring
Louisiana lawyers with her who happened to have their wallet-size bar cards. Volunteers from
around the country were turned away. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See MacLean, supra note 117 (“Hundreds of prisoners who had either finished their
terms just before the storm, or faced misdemeanor charges such as public drinking or
solicitation, were unable to post bond before the storm hit. Or for others who did put up bail,
computers and phone lines died before they could be processed and released.”).
146. Id.
147. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50.
148. Id.; Interview with Nick Trenticosta, supra note 61.
149. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50.
150. Id.
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then filed an appellate writ asking the state supreme court to appoint
a single judge to take charge of the habeas process, or at least one
judge per district, and asking for a single clerk’s office to accept all of
151
the filings. The supreme court refused to accept the filing, stating
that the court was closed and would not be reopened for the purposes
of hearing the motion, with three justices dissenting.152
After several months, New Orleans Chief Criminal Judge Calvin
Johnson provided some relief. He began ordering the release of
defendants who had served their sentences, and gave the district
attorney a deadline for charging those who had not yet formally been
charged.153 That deadline was pushed back, but then finally upheld, by
154
the state supreme court. On January 6, 2006, the district attorney’s
office complied with the deadline and filed charges on 1,140
defendants.155 On September 22, 2005, defense attorney Nick
Trenticosta also filed a section 1983 petition in federal court, asking
Judge Jay Zainey to release the women at Angola who should already
have been released, which Judge Zainey did.156
Posting bond became difficult where relevant Orleans Parish
institutions were closed or scattered.157 Wardens could not release
prisoners without a signed court order or posted bond. The first
158
defendant was not released on bond until October. State and local
jailers were slow to release prisoners after posting bond.159 There was
also a reluctance to release prisoners directly into the communities

151. See Ansari v. State, 913 So. 2d 834 (La. 2005) (denying an emergency motion to open
court).
152. Id.
153. Richard A. Webster, Prisoners Evacuated for Katrina and Scattered in Jails Throughout
LA Now in Legal Limbo, NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, Jan. 16, 2006, at 1, 32.
154. See Kimbrough v. Cooper, 915 So. 2d 344, 344, 345 (La. 2005) (“The stay previously
issued on November 18, 2005, is lifted. . . . [T]he state shall have until 5:00 p.m. on January 6,
2006, in which to file a bill of information of indictment . . . .”).
155. Webster, supra note 153, at 32.
156. Complaint for Civil Rights Violations and Request for Injunctive Relief at 10,
Gettridge v. Gusman, 2005 WL 3162040 (E.D. La. 2005) (No. 2:05-cv-04200-JCZ-KWR); Filosa,
supra note 59 (noting that Judge Zainey ordered the release on September 22, 2005).
157. See MacLean, supra note 117 (“[C]omputers and phone lines died before [prisoners
who had put up bail] could be processed and released. . . .”); Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra
note 50.
158. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50.
159. The criminal defense bar argues that FEMA created a financial incentive for the jails to
hold inmates too long by reimbursing jailers per inmate per day, though FEMA had yet to pay
the prisons by January 2006. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50; Interview with Burl
Cain, supra note 50.
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160
surrounding jails. Sheriff Gusman sent buses only twice a week to
collect released prisoners, thus adding days to their sentences without
authority.161 The process sped up after the Tulane Law School
Criminal Defense Clinic moved to hold the deputy warden in
162
contempt.
Phyllis Mann attributes the court system’s early paralysis to
“Katrina coma,” which rendered “capable, hardworking, talented
people incapable of decision and action; . . . they were themselves the
victims of the hurricane, without homes and without family members.
163
They were just not functioning.” Local courts also, unsurprisingly,
had failed to plan how they would react to the entire city being almost
wiped away, or even to make obvious provisional plans for a
predictable major hurricane. The entity most capable of reacting to
the crisis across local jurisdictional lines was the state supreme
court.164 Phyllis Mann argued:

The Supreme Court should have a system in place that allows for
law, for civilization to continue in the face of a disaster. . . . We
literally had no system of law for at least the first two months after
the hurricane. There were judges who said to us, “the court of
appeals is closed. Where are you going to go?” No one was in
165
charge. The decisions being made were to not make a decision.

The state supreme court, itself displaced during the storm, did
166
eventually set up offices in Baton Rouge. Nevertheless, as noted,
the supreme court did not ensure the orderly administration of justice
after the storm.
Early paralysis during the first two months then persisted for
more than a year. The court system continued to permit mass
detentions for upwards of six months for those who still faced
criminal charges, but who lacked access to defense counsel. Six

160. Weinstein, supra note 30.
161. Interview with Marlin Gusman, supra note 30.
162. Interview with Katherine Mattes, Clinical Instructor, Tulane Law School, in New
Orleans, La. (Oct. 23, 2006).
163. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50.
164. Interview with Nick Trenticosta, supra note 61; Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note
50.
165. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50.
166. Finch, supra note 116.
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months after Hurricane Katrina, 700 to 1,500 defendants remained
167
incarcerated, together with 3,000 who still face charges.
Hearings regarding the situation were only finally convened
following Judge Arthur Hunter’s ruling in February 2006 that postKatrina the New Orleans public defender system, with only six
lawyers remaining, could no longer adequately represent its over four
168
thousand clients. The effect, as Chief Judge Johnson noted, was “a
de facto shutdown of the public defender’s office.”169 Judge Hunter
initially imposed a deadline of summer 2006, almost a year after
Katrina, before he would even begin to order release of inmates who
have not seen a lawyer and have not been tried, and order charges
170
dropped against three thousand others released but facing charges.
He ordered the district attorney’s office to compile a list of indigent
detainees still facing charges, and stated that he would order their
release in the summer of 2006 if the state did not provide adequate
indigent defense funding.171 After repeating and delaying his
deadlines, Judge Hunter finally released four defendants because of
172
inadequacy of counsel on October 6, 2006. The district attorney still
refused to help triage cases, declaring that it was not his job to help
free defendants.173
Finally, six months after Katrina, some Louisiana state funding
was allocated for local indigent defense, but Judge Hunter stated in
his court order that “instead of the state providing a cure, it has only
prescribed a Band-Aid and the bleeding continues.”174 Efforts remain

167. Id.
168. See Perlstein, supra note 4 (“Criminal Court Judge Arthur Hunter ruled that the
Orleans Parish Indigent Defender Program can no longer adequately represent poor defendants
[and noted that] ‘[f]or all practical purposes, the public defender program no longer exists.’”).
169. Id. (Chief Judge Johnson added, “Crisis is not a big enough word to describe the
situation. . . . The public defender situation was bad before Katrina. Now it’s a full-blown
disaster.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
170. Gwen Filosa, Judge says he’ll release inmates unless state pays for lawyers, TIMESPICAYUNE, Apr. 7, 2006, at B1.
171. Id.
172. Telephone Interview with Steve Singer, Clinical Professor, Loyola Law School, and
Chief of Trials, New Orleans Public Defender’s Office (Oct. 6, 2006); Mary Foster, Judge Frees
Four Inmates Without Lawyers, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 7, 2006.
173. Judge Vows to Free Inmates Held Since Katrina Hit (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 25,
2006) [hereinafter Judge Vows], available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=5708448.
174. Id.
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stalled to fundamentally change the methods of funding indigent
175
defense to make it sustainable.
Beginning in April, law school faculty stepped in to operate and
redesign the public defender’s office. The judges appointed a new
board, including Tulane Law School professor Pamela Metzger and
Loyola Law Professor Dane Ciolino, which then hired Yale Law
Professor Ronald Sullivan to direct the office and Loyola Clinical
176
Professor Steve Singer as chief of trials. With scarce resources, the
new directors have attempted to make major structural reforms such
177
as requiring public defenders to work full time. The office has
exactly four working computers, two telephones and a docket of
178
thousands of cases.
After Katrina, the first criminal bench trial was not held until
179
March 31, 2006, and the first jury trial on June 5, 2006. During the
subsequent four months, there were only about fifteen jury trials
despite three thousand pending cases.180 A year after the storm, prison
officials, public defenders and law school clinic students continued to
181
locate hundreds of inmates who had yet to see a lawyer or a judge.

175. Perlstein, supra note 4; see Laura Maggi, Katrina adds to public defender woes, TIMESPICAYUNE, Mar. 23, 2006, at B1 (describing hearings investigating the adequacy of indigent
defense in New Orleans Parish, and noting that “a scathing report released this month by a New
Orleans-based advocacy group found that of 83 interviewed defendants from the city locked up
before the hurricane hit Aug. 29, just four had met with an attorney”).
176. Id.; Laura Maggi, Judge blasts public defender for delay, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 12,
2006, at B1. Even before taking over the operation of the public defender’s office, law school
faculty became heavily involved in the crisis. In October, 2005, Chief Judge Johnson appointed
the Tulane and Loyola Criminal Clinics to represent all indigent defendants for the purpose of
arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. Telephone interview with Pamela Metzger, Associate
Professor, Tulane Law School (Oct. 23, 2005).
177. Maggi, supra note 175; Interview with Steve Singer, supra note 172.
178. Judge Vows, supra note 173.
179. Filosa, supra note 170; see Gwen Filosa, Orleans trials resume with familiar themes,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 8, 2006, at B1 (reporting that the first six-member jury trial on June 5
ended with a hung jury, and that the first twelve-member jury acquitted two defendants tried on
police testimony alone).
180. Interview with Steve Singer, supra note 172.
181. Gwen Filosa, Pledge to release detainees unmet: Frustrated judge orders report on
indigents’ cases, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 31, 2006, at B1. On the anniversary of the storm, Judge
Arthur Hunter issued a ruling stating that “t]he entire criminal justice infrastructure in New
Orleans is being held together with spit and tape, and it is just a matter of time before the
system collapses . . . . Now, one year after Hurricane Katrina, the Orleans Public Defenders
reports it is practically no better off today than it was in February 2006, and far worse than it
was before Hurricane Katrina.” Id.
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G. The Federal Response
The federal government after Katrina did not intervene
significantly in the criminal justice area. Since the storm, New Orleans
teeters on the edge of bankruptcy with only two months of operating
budget; its tax base, made up primarily of property and sales taxes,
182
washed away in the storm and will take years to recover. In 1988,
however, Congress passed legislation prohibiting FEMA from
providing operating expenses to local government, although it may
provide money for repairing buildings and loans to homeowners and
businesses.183 In the past, the president forgave emergency loans to
local government, but Congress amended the Katrina relief bill to
prohibit forgiveness, and thus local governments signed loan
applications with dubious promises of an ability to repay, with
repayments beginning immediately.184
Nine months after the storm, the Department of Justice gave
grants totaling $58 million for the benefit of all of the local criminal
justice systems affected by the storm, including $2.8 million for the
beleaguered Orleans Parish public defender’s office.185 The office
remains, however, seriously underfunded. The Justice Department
commissioned a study estimating the cost of creating a
constitutionally adequate public defender’s budget at $8.2 million
annually and with $10.7 million required for the first year to establish
such an office.186

182. See Donze, supra note 126 (“Bankruptcy should be considered as an option for New
Orleans’ financially crippled government and public school system, which are ‘teetering on the
edge of a cliff’ . . . .”).
183. See supra note 7.
184. See Landrieu pushes for loans to be forgiven, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 19, 2005, at A7;
Michelle Millhollon, St. Bernard Officials Say Funding Crucial, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.),
Oct. 4, 2005, at 1-A. President Bush continues to cite the misleading figure of $85 billion
provided for hurricane relief; however, little was allocated for state or local government. First,
federal authorities can estimate only that “more than half” of the money has been spent. $29.7
billion was allocated for “administration”; and $18.5 billion was allocated for payment of flood
insurance claims, for which homeowners paid premiums. Bill Walsh, Dollars faulted as measure
of help; ‘$85 billion is a lot,’ but needs remain, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 15, 2006, at A1. $67
billion of the grand total was allocated for emergency response and recovery. That figure
includes $5.4 billion for trailers and $5 billion in temporary housing aid, but no money to fund
local government services. Id.
185. Laura Maggi, Indigent office in for nearly $3 million; But it’s a drop in the bucket,
officials say, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 12, 2006, at B1.
186. CHIARKIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 26. The White House’s report describing Katrina
failings recommends future federal study of federal assistance to local law enforcement. See
THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED
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II. EMERGENCY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND FEDERALISM
The constitutional problem of criminal justice collapse reverses
the conventional paradigm of constitutional rights during an
emergency. Courts and scholars have focused since the Founding, and
more recently since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the
scope of civil liberties during wartime and executive aggrandizement
of power during emergencies. None have focused on how
emergencies affect “everyday criminal justice” provided by local
government officials, judges, prosecutors, public defenders and
police.187 Our project here, however, explores that bedrock provision
of “everyday criminal justice” by local actors and institutions during
exigent circumstances. The collapse of the New Orleans criminal
justice system and the response of local, state, and federal
government in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina present difficult
new questions about the Constitution’s protective role in the criminal
system during natural disasters or terrorist attacks.
We argue that criminal procedure rules remain highly vulnerable
to failure in their protective roles during times of emergency. PostKatrina, criminal procedure rules did not safeguard individual
liberties nor ensure orderly emergency administration of justice,
because the unprepared and underresourced local criminal system
simply collapsed. Doctrines animated by the concept of federalism
hindered the provision of federal assistance to local institutions which
could have been of particular help in the period just after the storm.
Left particularly helpless, long after those first weeks and months,
were individuals such as indigent criminal defendants whose
constitutional rights had already been neglected for years.
A. Indefinite Suspension of Criminal Procedure
The Constitution’s role in guiding the provision of criminal
justice in times of emergency remains largely unexplored. The

65–66 (2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf (last visited Aug.
22, 2006) (calling for a system of “national preparedness”).
187. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (noting that the Court uses a standard
of “heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of
national security”); Louis D. Bilionis, Conservative Reformation, Popularization, and the
Lessons Of Reading Criminal Justice As Constitutional Law, 52 UCLA L. REV. 979, 986 (2005)
(“As those decisions bear out, the dominant American legal mindset strives to conceptualize the
relevant issues as out-of-the-ordinary struggles between freedom and society, belonging to the
rubrics of war, emergency, and national security rather than everyday criminal justice.”).
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response after Katrina provides a case study in the legal and
normative force of those criminal procedure safeguards when the
institutions of justice collapse. Far from unduly constraining criminal
justice actors during emergencies, we argue that several of the
relevant current constitutional criminal procedure rules already
sufficiently relax during times of emergency. Nevertheless, postKatrina, the constitutional rules that could be bent were broken
across the board. The rules were not too thin to provide needed
protection, but remained vulnerable as courts suspended the
Constitution sub silencio. If state and federal courts had acted more
quickly to end what amounted to an unconstitutional suspension of
habeas corpus, local actors could have complied months sooner,
preventing ongoing constitutional violations that tarnished the
criminal system and disrupted the lives of thousands detained and
their families.
A starting point in examining emergency criminal procedure is
the Federal Constitution, which contains only one provision on point:
the Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause. The Suspension Clause states:
“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.”188 The Clause applies only to the federal government,
permitting suspension by Congress. It has rarely been invoked, most
significantly by President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War in a
manner later found unconstitutional by the Court but then authorized
by Congress.189 In one previous example of a suspension of habeas

188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
189. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487); see WILLIAM F.
DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 145 (1980) (“Lincoln thus believed
that as Commander-in-chief he had implied power to execute the habeas clause.”); DANIEL
FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 17–19 (2003) (“Lincoln authorized the suspension of
habeas corpus anywhere necessary between Philadelphia and Washington.”). Additional
suspensions occurred during Reconstruction and the War of 1812. See ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 457–58 (1988)
(“Grant in October 1871 proclaimed a ‘condition of lawlessness’ in nine [South Carolina]
upcountry counties and suspended the writ of habeas corpus.”). General Andrew Jackson
ignored one writ of habeas corpus when he imposed martial law in New Orleans. Johnson v.
Duncan, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 530 (La. 1815); see DUKER, supra, at 142, 172 n.128 (“The Supreme
Court of Louisiana in Johnson v. Duncan—a case arising from General Andrew Jackson’s
declaration of martial law in New Orleans during the War of 1812—citing Bollman, declared
that the Constitution had exclusively vested in Congress the right of suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and that that body was the sole judge of the necessity that called for
the suspension.”). President Andrew Johnson suspended the writ for a conspirator in President
Lincoln’s assassination. See REHNQUIST, supra note 6, at 165 (“[The government] showed the
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corpus, after Pearl Harbor, habeas corpus jurisdiction was suspended
in the then-territory of Hawaii. Martial law was declared with
authorization of federal legislation, and a U.S. military officer
appointed “commanding Governor,” for three years, from 1941 to
1944, closed all courts of the Territory, established military tribunals,
and suspended habeas corpus.190 The Supreme Court ultimately held
that the military regime could not “obliterate the judicial system of
191
Hawaii.”
Most state constitutions have similar suspension clauses, and
some states have suspended habeas corpus during emergencies;
Massachusetts, Vermont, and Virginia legislatures suspended the writ
during Shay’s Rebellion, as did other states during labor strikes in the
192
early 1900s. Louisiana’s state constitution provides that “[t]he writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended.”193 But even if Louisiana
courts did not explicitly suspend habeas corpus in violation of the
Louisiana constitution, they all but extinguished its efficacy in state
courts. After Katrina, thousands languished in state prisons for
months, awaiting a chance to meet with an attorney and a decision of
whether the prosecutor would proceed (required under state law
within sixty days). Without any legislative suspension of habeas

court the endorsement of President Johnson suspending the writ of habeas corpus, and [Judge
Andrew] Wylie declined to act further.”). The writ was suspended by the Governor of the
Philippines during a “state of insecurity and terrorism among the people” resisting U.S. rule.
Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 179–81 (1906). Additional suspensions included a suspension of
habeas corpus to combat anti-black violence in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in 1923, and a series of
suspensions of habeas corpus during labor strikes in mining states including Colorado, Idaho,
and West Virginia. Martial Law Widened After New Outrage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1923, at 2; see
generally Note, Habeas Corpus-Strikes-Suspension, 38 YALE L.J. 545 (1929) (reviewing labor
strike suspensions of habeas corpus in various states).
190. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 309 (1946); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 6,
at 212–17 (offering an account of “Hawaii under martial law”).
191. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 315.
192. See, e.g., An Act to prevent Routs, Riots, and tumultuous Assemblies, and the evil
Consequences thereof, 1786 Mass. Acts, ch. 8 (prohibiting “any persons to the number of
twelve, or more, being armed with clubs, or other weapons [from remaining] unlawfully,
routously, riotously or tumultuously assembled . . .”); Vermont Riot Act of 1787, reprinted in 14
STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT: LAWS OF VERMONT 265–66, 281–84 (J. Williams ed., 1966);
Virginia Riot Act of 1786, reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 517–19 (J. Boyd
ed., 1955); Richard H. Kohn, The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of the Framers,
in THE UNITED STATES MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–
1989, at 69–72 (Richard H. Kohn ed., 1991); Jason Collins Weid, A Republic of Emergencies:
Martial Law in American Jurisprudence, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1397, 1413–16 (2004) (describing
state court suspensions of habeas corpus in response to strikes).
193. LA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
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corpus, the state court system suspended its rules and failed to hold
any hearings regarding the prisoners. Only a few state courts haltingly
granted habeas petitions and ordered release of prisoners. And again,
most prisoners had no access to counsel and only a few were
represented by counsel to file habeas petitions. Worse, when a few
trial judges did approve the grant of habeas corpus petitions, the
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and delayed the releases, citing its
suspension of court deadlines. Federal courts granted relief to only a
few prisoners.194
Detaining thousands of prisoners indefinitely, often under
misdemeanor charges, violated a host of constitutional provisions, yet
we argue that each violation was entirely preventable in the months
that followed Hurricane Katrina.
First, the Due Process Clause provides a constitutional right of
access to attorneys and to courts.195 The state’s failure to ensure that
counsel and families promptly received information about the
location of clients during an indefinite detention by the state raises
substantial constitutional concerns.196
Second, defendants clearly do not have constitutionally adequate
representation if no counsel is available even to meet with them,
197
much less represent them. Most of the thousands of detainees had
no defense lawyer to raise constitutional claims and have not even
seen a public defender. The six public defenders remaining in New
Orleans after Katrina198 simply could not handle 4,200 backlogged
cases; they did not try, and instead struggled to keep up with
199
arraignments in new cases. Yet state courts waited over six months
before even convening hearings regarding the lack of indigent
defense counsel; out-of-state volunteer lawyers were not even
solicited.
Third, the Sixth Amendment also provides for a “right to a
200
speedy . . . trial,” because as the Supreme Court has stated,
194. On federalism and reasons why they might have deferred—improperly, we argue—to a
suspended state court system, see infra Part II.B.1.
195. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (holding that failure to provide library
facilities violated the right of access to courts).
196. See id.; see also Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
197. See infra Part II.B.2.
198. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
199. See supra text accompanying note 133.
200. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial . . . .”).
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“inordinate delay between arrest, indictment, and trial may impair a
201
defendant’s ability to present an effective defense.” Trials are
unlikely within the state statutory deadline;202 “for ten months after
203
the water receded, not a single jury trial” occurred in New Orleans.
As for the 700 to 1,500 defendants still incarcerated six months
after the storm, many for minor charges, together with approximately
204
3,000 who also still faced charges but had not been tried, Chief
Judge Johnson noted, “If I were a defense lawyer, I would raise
[speedy trial claims] every moment, every opportunity that I get . . . I
would be standing on top of tables raising it.”205
Fourth, due process should prevent the state from imprisoning
persons months beyond their release dates, particularly for
misdemeanors such as drinking in public, disturbing the peace, and
failing to pay tickets, and especially without providing counsel or
206
charging them with any crime. As noted, for months, “persons
arrested in New Orleans the weekend preceding the storm—many for
minor offenses, such as begging, prostitution, or drunk-anddisorderly—were still awaiting their hearing in a prison facility in
some far corner of the state.”207 Hearings to free those incarcerated
for minor charges should have been held promptly once courts
reopened, not months later.

201. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).
202. According to LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 578 (2003), “[N]o trial shall be
commenced . . . [i]n misdemeanor cases after one year from the date of institution of the
prosecution.”
203. Harriet Ryan, Justice delayed: ‘We the jury’ and other words unheard in New Orleans
since Katrina, COURT TV NEWS, Mar. 20, 2006, http://www.courttv.com/news/neworleans/
032006_notrials_ctv.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2006); Filosa, supra note 170; see Gwen Filosa,
Orleans trials resume with familiar themes, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 8, 2006, at B1.
204. Ryan, supra note 203.
205. Id. (ellipsis in original).
206. Such detention arguably violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g.,
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979) (“Due process requires that a pretrial detainee not
be punished.”); cf. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52 (1991) (“[P]rolonged
detention based on incorrect or unfounded suspicion may unjustly ‘imperil [a] suspect’s job,
interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships.’” (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975))) (second alteration in original).
207. Jack King, In The Wake Of The Hurricanes: NACDL Responds Quickly; Defense Bars
Regroup and Rebuild, CHAMPION, Nov. 2005, at 4, 10.
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Finally, the excessive bail clause applies where individuals were
detained without an opportunity to pay bail, or where judges set
208
excessively high bail for misdemeanors.
These constitutional provisions could have been complied with
had courts: insisted on prompt identification of prisoners and release
of their names to counsel and permitted attorney access (to provide
access to courts); permitted out-of-state volunteer attorneys to help,
and insisted on funding for public defenders for prosecutions to
proceed (to ensure adequate indigent defense counsel); conducted
hearings to release misdemeanor detainees (to address the due
process problem of indefinite detention for minor crimes); insisted
prosecutors issue prompt charge decisions or permit guilty pleas;
conducted proceedings in absentia including to reduce bail; and if all
else failed, granted habeas petitions.
The failure to accomplish those steps was more than
understandable in the immediate weeks after the storm. Each of
those steps, however, could have been taken within months when
courts reopened. Instead, even after a year, actors violated
constitutional criminal procedure rather than restore normalcy.209
Local judges, themselves elected officials, repeatedly threatened to
dismiss cases and release prisoners, but never acted on their threats,
fearing perhaps the release of one who would then commit a violent
crime. Yet those judges did not ensure that prosecutors and defense
attorneys conducted proper screening to permit release of those
arrested for petty violations who posed no such danger. The system
simply collapsed with courts conducting no hearings and no trials, and
with no defense counsel available.
Nor did any executive reach out to assume powers over criminal
justice matters. Instead, the official response institutionalized the
Louisiana judiciary’s fundamental inability to maintain the orderly
administration of the criminal process. The Louisiana legislature

208. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752–55 (1984) (invoking the Excessive Bail
Clause to assess the facial constitutionality of a statute which allowed a judicial officer to deny
certain arrestees an opportunity to pay bail); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (“Bail set at a
figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill [its] purpose is ‘excessive’ under
the Eighth Amendment.”).
209. One might think emergencies would merely provide an additional period of necessity
justifying crafting of exceptions to constitutional rules; instead the rules were suspended
entirely. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 963 (1995) (“A rule
with necessity or emergency exceptions might be described, somewhat imprecisely, as a strong
presumption.”).
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passed permanent legislation permitting courts to suspend habeas
corpus for ninety days and indefinitely thereafter until the governordeclared “emergency” subsides. The legislature thus confirmed that
what occurred after Katrina was, effectively, a state court suspension
210
of habeas corpus.
Related was the failure to respond systematically to the
211
The elected
emergency by reconsidering overcriminalization.
district attorney did not, after months passed, triage cases and release
persons imprisoned for petty crimes or who had already completed
their sentences. When an emergency sorely stresses the public order,
expending criminal justice resources on minor infractions has a
greater relative cost to government, but worse, incarceration imposes
a greater social cost on families already strained and separated during
an emergency. Mark Tushnet writes that emergencies “provide new
information relevant to the assessment of the costs and benefits of
some policies.”212 Those costs and benefits were not reconsidered by
criminal justice actors in Louisiana.
Thus, a state criminal system effectively suspended habeas
corpus for months in the face of mass detentions, long after courts
had reconvened and could have held hearings, long after prosecutors
could have conducted screening and triage of cases (and long after an
ad hoc team of volunteers conducted their own screening). The
legislature and the governor likewise failed to intervene. As a result,
thousands languished in prisons and families remained separated,
adding to post-Katrina dislocation and trauma. It remains to be seen
whether any will receive civil compensation for the ordeals that they
suffered.213

210. See infra notes 262–64 and accompanying text.
211. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 509 (2001) (“The . . . natural assumption is that the public would want to criminalize only
the kinds of things criminals, understood in the ordinary sense of that word, do. Yet
contemporary criminal codes cover a good deal of marginal middle-class behavior . . . .”).
212. Mark Tushnet, Issues of Method in Analyzing the Policy Response to Emergencies, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1581, 1589 (2004).
213. Regarding the ACLU lawsuit filed on behalf of a group of detainees in New Orleans
Parish prison, see supra note 111. See also, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error,
and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 48–51, 53–56 (describing standard
to show malicious prosecution and elements of section 1983 claims alleging wrongful
convictions); see generally Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework For Compensating
Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947 (2005) (arguing that excessive use of pre-trial
detention should be considered a compensable “liberty taking”).
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B. Federalism and Vulnerability of Local Criminal Justice Actors
While criminal procedure rights did not help or constrain law
enforcement, but were instead ignored, a second set of
constitutionally-inspired federalism principles hindered provision of
emergency relief. Lingering in the aftermath of Katrina is the
question of why federal assistance came so slowly to local criminal
justice actors, when it came at all. As to law enforcement assistance,
for example, federalism delayed relief as President Bush and
Governor Blanco debated the form of military help. The
complications of “Our Federalism,” which long has characterized our
approach to criminal law, contributed to confusion resulting in
meager assistance provided post-Katrina, not just of federal troops,
but also by judicial review of habeas petitions and financial assistance
to criminal courts, prisons, prosecutors and indigent defense
attorneys. Nevertheless, a lack of local resources before the
emergency made the New Orleans local criminal justice system
already vulnerable. Federal and judicial reluctance to intervene postKatrina can be in part attributed to the practical limits of their ability
to remedy such longstanding structural deficiencies of local criminal
justice actors.
1. Hindering Emergency Relief. Federalism, or doctrines that
limit intrusion on prerogatives of state and local government,
characterizes the Supreme Court’s approach to regulating local
criminal justice institutions under the Constitution.214 The Court has
repeatedly held that matters of criminal justice are the states’
“primary authority” and that federal courts may not intrude on

214. See Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (1987) (“It is not that the states deserve autonomy simply
because they are states, but rather that it is appropriate to leave the states alone, to accord them
a ‘separate sphere,’ [sic] because the ‘National Government will fare best’ that way.” (footnote
omitted) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971))); Barry Friedman, Valuing
Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1997) (“To all appearances, the United States has a
federal system. This generally means that regulatory authority is divided between a national
government and many state governments. Those governments are free, within constitutional
bounds, to develop and pursue their own regulatory agendas, supported by the power to tax and
spend.”); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1402
(1997) (“[F]ederalism is a decentralized decisionmaking system that is . . . responsive to local
interests and preference, that can tailor programs to local conditions and needs, and that can
provide innovation in creating new programs.”).
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215
an area “where States historically have been
criminal law,
216
sovereign.” That traditional deference to state and community
administration of justice, though justified for a host of reasons, had
unexpected harmful effects on the ability of actors to respond and
recover after Hurricane Katrina. Federal assistance, in several areas,
would have provided crucial support, particularly in the period
immediately following the storm when state and local actors
remained in the greatest disarray.
Principles of federalism made it more difficult for the federal
government to assist local police in need. First, federal officials
remain barred from conducting law enforcement by the
Reconstruction-era Posse Comitatus Act, which makes it a federal
217
crime for federal troops to “execute the laws” in the states. The Act
sought not to prevent emergency assistance, but rather to prevent
federal officials from monitoring Jim Crow elections after
Reconstruction.218 The Constitution also limits domestic exercise of
federal military power (already prevented under Posse Comitatus
from conducting law enforcement) to two limited emergency
circumstances, during a natural disaster or during domestic violence,
but only with the governor’s consent or to enforce a federal court’s

215. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (“The States possess primary authority
for defining and enforcing the criminal law. . . . Federal intrusions into state criminal trials
frustrate both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to
honor constitutional rights.”).
216. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995); see United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (“We . . . reject the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic,
violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.
The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (“The power of the Federal Government would
be augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress into its service—and at no cost to itself—
the police officers of the 50 States.”); see also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945)
(“Our national government is one of delegated powers alone. Under our federal system the
administration of criminal justice rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the
scope of those delegated powers, has created offenses against the United States.”).
217. See Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000) (prohibiting use of armed forces to
“execute the laws” and making willful violation punishable by up to two years imprisonment).
Posse comitatus refers to the common law power of a sheriff to call up a “posse” of able-bodied
people to assist in arrests or to suppress riots. E.g., Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238, 240–41 (4th
Cir. 1973); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1200–01 (8th ed. 2004).
218. See, e.g., United States v. Allred, 867 F.2d 856, 870 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The legislative and
judicial history of the Act, however, indicates that its purpose springs from an attempt to end
the use of federal troops to police state elections in ex-Confederate states.”); H.R. REP. NO. 9771, pt. II, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1785, 1787 (“[N]o one has been charged
or prosecuted under the Posse Comitatus Act since its enactment.”).
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219
order. These requirements create possibilities for crossed signals
during emergencies, as after Katrina when battles over federalism and
whether the governor had consented delayed crucial military
assistance for rescue missions. Further, federal troops lack law
enforcement training because, after all, the Posse Comitatus Act
prohibits law enforcement.220
Similarly, principles of federalism supported federal courts’
reluctance to grant petitions for the release of the thousands of
indefinitely detained prisoners after Hurricane Katrina. Federal
courts must abstain under Younger v. Harris221 from enjoining
pending state prosecutions.222 The Court’s rationale in Younger was
based on “the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state
functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up
of a Union of separate state governments . . . . This . . . is referred to
223
by many as ‘Our Federalism . . . .’” The Court did note that perhaps
in “extraordinary circumstances” when a threat is “great and
immediate” and “when absolutely necessary for protection of

219. The first of the Militia Clauses permits Congress to call the militia, our modern day
National Guard, but only to “suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 15 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”). Also the Constitution
permits the president to call the National Guard upon the request of a state to protect against
“domestic Violence” short of a national emergency. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United
States . . . shall protect each of them [the States] against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
Violence.”); see also 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) (“Whenever there is an insurrections [sic] in any
State . . . the President may, upon the request of [that State’s] legislature or of its governor if the
legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States,
in the number requested by that State . . . .”).
220. See Baum, supra note 15, at 60 (“[The author] asked a sergeant first class what he and
his men were permitted to do . . . . ‘We’re just trick-or-treating,’ he said. ‘If I saw someone going
in that store right there, I couldn’t do anything but radio it in.’”) Perhaps those reasons explain
why, despite the president’s call for “greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed
forces” during emergencies, no such authority has been granted by Congress. See Angie C.
Marek, National Security Watch: The militarization of disaster response, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050921/21natsec.htm (last
visited Aug. 18, 2006).
221. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
222. See id. at 41, 49, 53–54 (holding that federal courts may not enjoin pending state
prosecutions); see also Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the
Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 75 (1984) (“The Younger v. Harris abstention doctrine
provides that a federal court may not enjoin an ongoing state criminal proceeding, even to
protect federal constitutional rights.” (footnote omitted)).
223. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.

04__GARRETT_TETLOW.DOC

2006]

CRIMINAL JUSTICE COLLAPSE

11/14/2006 8:38 AM

165
224

constitutional rights,” federal courts could enjoin criminal actions.
After Katrina, the threat to constitutional rights arguably appeared
quite great, immediate, and not adequately remedied in largely closed
state courts (in which prosecutions were arguably not “pending”).
Federal judges granted only a few hundred habeas or section 1983
petitions after Katrina, and they did not issue written opinions. The
Younger abstention doctrine, despite its exceptions, may explain why
federal courts failed to intervene more broadly to grant relief to the
thousands of illegally detained prisoners that remained, and why
defense lawyers did not seek more sweeping relief.
Still more troubling, principles of federalism also hindered the
provision of financial aid sorely needed at least in the immediate
period following the storm. Given their already sparse resources,
financial assistance, not military patrols, might have been the most
useful federal contribution to local police, courts, prisons, prosecutors
and public defenders. Yet legislation providing for disaster relief and
funding also reflects traditional reluctance to interfere with local law
government. The federal executive branch has been granted a raft of
statutory emergency powers under the Stafford Act,225 which allows
the federal government to provide aid to families226 and repair
227
damaged buildings. The Act does not, however, provide for or
permit payment of operating expenses for local government, and thus
the only aid law enforcement or criminal courts can receive is to
repair buildings. There is no routine source for federal emergency
criminal justice funding, and no funding was provided during the
crucial months after Hurricane Katrina.228 The federal government
could provide support without undermining local law enforcement by
funding implementation of emergency plans to assist lawyers, courts,
prisons, and police in administering justice during emergencies.

224. Id. at 45 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926)).
225. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5206 (2000)).
226. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5174, 5177–5183 (2000).
227. Id. §§ 5171–5172.
228. The Justice Department does provide grants for pilot projects through its Bureau of
Justice Assistance, and it did later provide a grant of $58 million for courts, prosecutors,
indigent defense, and law enforcement, which will provide some emergency assistance for the
local criminal justice systems in the New Orleans region, but “is not enough to tackle needed
systemic changes.” Maggi, supra note 185.
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2. The Persistence of Inadequate Indigent Defense. Doctrines of
federalism had unanticipated effects, hindering efforts to release
detained prisoners, assist law enforcement, and provide financial
support to local law enforcement. Nevertheless, the efficacy of federal
assistance after an emergency has limits. Federal assistance, including
judicial review of indefinite detentions, could have provided
important assistance, particularly during the initial period after the
storm. The sustained nature of the local institutional collapse for
upwards of a year, however, must be attributed to the local criminal
system’s vulnerability during an emergency. The New Orleans
criminal system remained precariously balanced before the
emergency for a variety of reasons, including the political
unpopularity of expending resources for indigent defendants, lack of
resources, and lack of planning, all in addition to insufficient
enforcement of constitutional rules. The longstanding problem of
indigent defense funding in particular provides a clear example of the
limitations of judicial enforcement of constitutional rights given
underlying vulnerability of local criminal justice institutions.
The underlying lack of criminal justice resources in the area of
indigent defense reflects no simple cause, but rather systemic
problems in many jurisdictions, not just New Orleans, that have
persisted for decades. Although Louisiana provides very low indigent
defense funding and is the only state to rely chiefly on traffic tickets
and court costs to fund indigent defense, studies have shown
pervasive underfunding of indigent defense in many other states.229

229. See A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 8 (2004)
(“[A] significant funding crisis persists today. Throughout [hearings conducted by the A.B.A.’s
Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants], witnesses from each of the
twenty-two states examined reported grave inadequacies in the available funds and resources
for indigent defense.”); NAT’L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS’N, supra note 13, at 31–32
(“Alabama’s plan for defender services has been universally criticized for its systematic
deficiencies, including inadequate funding. . . . [I]t is . . . telling that Louisiana’s funding does not
even match Alabama’s low threshold.”); THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE AND COUNTY
EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 34, 36–37 (2003),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/indigent
defexpend2003.pdf (tabular state by state comparison shows twenty-six states with less annual
state-wide indigent defense funding than Louisiana, though some significant variation can also
be explained by caseloads, presence of death penalty cases, appointment of counsel for
misdemeanor cases and civil cases); see generally THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/va-report2004.pdf (study
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Similarly, in other states, studies report that due to inadequate
resources, in nonemergency circumstances, indigent arrestees often
230
wait weeks or months in detention before seeing a lawyer.
Perhaps because the problem of grossly underfunded indigent
defense counsel has remained so widespread and intractable, the
Supreme Court elaborated a constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel, but has stopped short of setting any baseline
level of resources. The Supreme Court’s current constitutional test
reflects the limitations of judicially-enforced criminal procedure
rights and the role of federalism, but also the failings of local
institutional actors. The Court’s test asks in an individual case
whether counsel was “reasonably effective” and whether there was
prejudice to the outcome at trial.231 Commentators have criticized the
test, arguing that given local political unwillingness to fund indigent
criminal defense, “Gideon requires some budgetary floors if it is to
fulfill its promise.”232 According to the Supreme Court, however, an
advantage of its approach is to avoid the need for inquiry into
systemic inadequacy. As the Court put it, “the entire criminal justice
system” should not “suffer[]” the burden of litigating such claims.233
Principles of federalism counseled against intruding into state and
local policy choices regarding the baseline level of resources for
criminal justice; the Court does not typically define constitutional
rights as “affirmative” rights or entitlements for the indigent, whether

documenting grossly inadequate indigent defense resources based on data collection in eleven
states).
230. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra note
229, at 23 (“[I]n some places throughout the country, poor persons accused of crime are arrested
and detained in local jails for months or even years before they have a chance to speak with a
lawyer.”).
231. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
232. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 70 (1997).
233. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
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the context is public benefits, education, medical care, police
237
238
protection, or criminal law. (One exception to that general rule
applies to those in custody, for whom the government assumes an
affirmative obligation to provide reasonably safe conditions, food,
clothing, and medical care.)239 Such deferential principles give
localities the primary responsibility to fund counsel for the indigent at
appropriate levels to ensure constitutionally adequate defense.
New Orleans and the State of Louisiana failed to do so for
decades. The Louisiana courts, a decade before Katrina, ruled against
the grossly underfunded indigent defense system in New Orleans. In
1993, Chief Judge Johnson held a series of hearings on defense
services after a public defender, Richard Teissier of the Orleans
Indigent Defender Program, informed the court that he had no
investigator, no funding for experts, and so many cases—418 cases to
be precise—that his clients were “routinely incarcerated 30 to 70 days

234. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260, 262 (1970) (reaching question regarding due
process rights of recipients of statutory welfare benefits, but not reaching whether there was any
constitutional right to such benefits); Barbara Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms,
and the Due Process Clause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 982, 1005 (1996) (“Courts are not institutionally
equipped to make the adjustments and readjustments necessary to resolve budget-allocation
issues.”); see also Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 420 (1993) (“[E]ven if we assume some rough
operational understanding of . . . each minimum entitlement . . . much more would have to be
decided: . . . . The[se] are questions that seem far better addressed by the legislative and
executive branches of government, questions that seem virtually out of the reach of the judiciary
absent special circumstances.”).
235. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 452, 461–62, 463, 465 (1988) (holding
that schools may charge bus fees to indigent families); San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (holding that education is not a fundamental right).
236. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) (“The Constitution imposes no obligation
on the States to pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigents.”).
237. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 187, 202 (1989) (“A
State may, through its courts and legislatures, impose such affirmative duties of care and
protection upon its agents as it wishes. But not ‘all common-law duties owed by government
actors were . . . constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” (quoting Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335 (1986)) (omission in original); Reiff v. City of Philadelphia, 471 F.
Supp. 1262, 1265 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (“The Constitution does not explicitly or implicitly provide a
right to adequate police protection.”).
238. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (refusing to set a baseline level of resources which a
criminal justice system must provide the indigent).
239. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200; see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–06 (1976)
(holding that a state violates the Eighth Amendment when it exhibits deliberate indifference to
a prisoner’s serious medical needs).
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240
before he meets with them.” Chief Judge Johnson concluded in this
case that the system of indigent defense in New Orleans was
unconstitutional and ordered the legislature to provide funding.241 The
Supreme Court of Louisiana on appeal agreed that indigent criminal
defendants in New Orleans received unconstitutionally inadequate
counsel, but was unwilling to order the Legislature to provide
additional funding (beyond the local funds from court fees and
tickets) for separation-of-powers reasons.242 The legislature then
created a state-funded Louisiana Indigent Defender Assistance
243
244
Board, though over time gross inadequacies reappeared, requiring
an additional judicial intervention that was still pending before
Katrina.245
Thus, courts may only with great difficulty ameliorate
longstanding institutional neglect, and only sustained review may
address persistent constitutional violations. Further, before-the-fact
attention is essential, given the even greater difficulty of a systemic
response after an emergency. The New Orleans system has only
slowly addressed the problem of inadequate indigent representation
in hearings convened following Judge Hunter’s ruling in February
2006 that after Katrina, the New Orleans public defender system
could no longer adequately represent its over 4,000 clients.246 Indeed,

240. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993). For additional discussion of the case, see
Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure Of Courts To Address Underfunded Indigent Defense
Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1736–38 (2005).
241. Peart, 621 So. 2d at 784–85. As a result, Peart received additional resources for his case,
resulting in acquittals on the charges against him in two separate trials. Id. at 785 & n.4.
242. Id. at 791.
243. 1997 La. Acts No. 1361, § 1 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:151 (2005)); see
State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, 336 (La. 2005) (discussing the legislature’s creation in 2003 of a
“blue ribbon” Louisiana Task Force on Indigent Defense Services to make reform
recommendations); Lee Hargrave, Ruminations: Mandates in the Louisiana Constitution of 1974;
How Did They Fare?, 58 LA. L. REV. 389, 398 n.45 (1998) (“In 1993, just before Peart was
decided, legislation to provide better funding for indigent defense was defeated. The legislature
did provide $5 million additional funds in 1994 and 1995. Also, after a report by an advisory
commission, the 1997 legislature established the Indigent Defense Assistance Board.” (citations
omitted)).
244. See Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-The-Fact Review of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 8 (“Over time, the money failed to keep
up with inflation and caseloads, and today New Orleans defense counsel still have heavy
caseloads.”).
245. Before Katrina, the Louisiana Supreme Court again intervened and ruled that a “trial
judge may halt the prosecution of [capital] cases” if sufficient indigent defense funding was not
timely provided. Citizen, 898 So. 2d at 339.
246. Perlstein, supra note 4.
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Richard Teissier, no longer a public defender, was appointed Special
247
Master to develop a plan to revise the indigent defense system.
Teissier noted, “It was broke before . . . . Now it’s rubble. It’s like the
Lower 9th Ward. It’s completely ravaged of even the appearance of a
public defender’s office.”248 Local efforts remain ongoing to change
fundamentally the system of indigent defense, though the local tax
base remains devastated, and state and federal assistance to date
cannot support an adequate system of representation.249 The Justice
Department has suggested that only a structural intervention can now
revive and recreate the formerly thirty-person and now six-person
New Orleans public defender staff so that it can adequately represent
its thousands of clients.250 Attempts to intervene will remain
inadequate until the sources of funding are improved and stabilized.
Framing the legal and policy problem of regulating baseline
resources as a safeguard for basic functioning of the criminal justice
system in times of emergency might encourage local, state or federal
actors to rethink the persistent problem of inadequate indigent
defense. Policymakers might start to view the problem in a different
light, as implicating the fundamental legitimacy of the criminal
process. Courts might also view differently case law regarding
inadequate funding for indigent counsel, which has never considered
251
the emergency provision of justice. Actors might particularly
scrutinize indigent defense funding contingent upon funding sources
that remain equivocal after an emergency.
Nevertheless, past and present experience in New Orleans
illustrates both the promise and the difficulties of relying upon
political actors and courts to remedy systematic vulnerability of local

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Maggi, supra note 175; Perlstein, supra note 4 (“The chairman of the [Orleans Parish
Indigent Defender Program] Board, Frank DeSalvo, vowed to return with a plan to resume
operations. ‘Sometimes you just have to do the best with what you’ve got,’ DeSalvo said.”); see
supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text (regarding state and federal contributions to date).
250. See CHIARKIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 10 (“[W]e present recommendations for both
short-term and long-term actions to address the indigent defense needs in Orleans Parish. The
short-term actions are primarily . . . to oversee the restructuring of the public defender
program . . . . The long-term actions are generally . . . to restructure the defender program.”).
251. Further, requiring that government provide a baseline amount of funding to ensure
minimally adequate counsel could be fairly simple for courts to police. See Stuntz, supra note
232, at 70–71 (“No judicial micromanagement would be necessary. Unlike prison cases, testing
compliance with judicial decrees would seem to be easy: Either the required appropriations
were made or they weren’t.”).
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criminal justice institutions. With these deep longstanding limitations
in mind, the next Part discusses potential reforms aimed at enabling
reluctant institutional actors to address the problem of emergency
criminal justice.
III. AN EMERGENCY CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina calls into question the
ability of the criminal justice system’s diffuse, divided, administrative
structure to respond to emergencies. As Professor William Stuntz
writes, “[F]or all its flaws, centralization does have one large
advantage—it permits easy adaptation to changed circumstances.”252
Decentralized local, state, and federal actors could not join together
to respond to adversity. After a crisis, it may prove difficult to
preserve constitutional functioning among constituent parts of a
criminal system, each with different or adverse interests and each
disparately affected by the emergency. Actors may agree, however, in
advance of a crisis to reach compromises regarding emergency
resources and procedures. We discuss below possibilities for
centralization and coordination in an emergency-oriented criminal
justice system.
A. The Kerner Commission Model
The travails of the Louisiana criminal justice system are not new;
the federal government proposed a range of reforms aimed at
preventing such a criminal justice collapse after nationwide urban
unrest and riots in 1967. President Lyndon Johnson appointed a
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, known as the
Kerner Commission, to make recommendations.253 The Commission
found that many cities experienced preventable failures in the
254
administration of criminal justice, and a chapter of the report
addressed the need for emergency planning to avoid aggravating
255
conditions of disorder.
252.
253.

Stuntz, supra note 6, at 2148 n.21.
NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 15–16 (1968).
254. See id. at 183 (“Partially paralyzed by decades of neglect, deficient in facilities,
procedures and personnel, overwhelmed by the demands of normal operations, lower courts
have staggered under the crushing new burdens of civil disorders.”).
255. See id. at 183–95 (chapter entitled “The Administration of Justice Under Emergency
Conditions”).
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Specifically, the Kerner Commission recommended that the
criminal justice system be used sparingly during an emergency to
256
maintain order rather than resort to mass arrests. The New Orleans
criminal justice system, like most, lacked any such protocols to limit
the scope of arrests or to handle mass arrests under emergency
conditions. The Kerner Commission also recommended that “each
community . . . undertake the difficult but essential task of reform and
emergency planning . . . to meet emergency needs.”257 The Kerner
Commission also suggested that local law enforcement develop
“mutual assistance pacts” and also interstate mutual assistance
agreements.258 In response, lawyers and police in several cities,
including New York and Washington, D.C., convened and issued
procedures for the “Administration of Justice Under Emergency
Conditions,” while others all but ignored the recommendations.259
Despite the limitations of expert study groups, such planning
could at least begin the process of preparation to avoid criminal
justice collapse. Nevertheless, few efforts have been made postKatrina to revive such planning. No “Katrina Criminal Justice
Commission” has investigated the causes of the criminal justice
260
collapse we describe, nor has any been convened. On the other
256. Id. at 189. The Kerner Commission also reported that mass arrests resulted in few
successful prosecutions, but instead caused overcrowding of facilities, inability of defense
lawyers to locate clients, and failure of prosecutors to screen cases. Id. at 184–85.
257. Id. at 187. Additionally, the Kerner Commission recommended specific planning
guidelines for communities to implement. Id. at 187–95, 282–83.
258. Id. at 283–86.
259. See generally COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS,
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA (1973) (recommending procedures to the Judicial Conference of the District of
Columbia to implement following an emergency); CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING
COUNCIL & VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER EMERGENCY
CONDITIONS (1969) (recommending procedures for New York City’s criminal justice system to
implement following an emergency).
260. A White House report calls for future study of the problem. WHITE HOUSE, supra note
186. The Senate rejected a call for an independent Katrina Commission, opting for an
investigative commission composed of members of Congress. See Charles Babington & Shailagh
Murray, Parties Scramble for Post-Katrina Leverage, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2005, at A6
(“[C]ongressional Republicans . . . announc[ed] the formation of an investigative commission
that they can control. They rejected Democratic appeals to model the panel after the Sept. 11
commission, which was made up of non-lawmakers and was equally balanced between
Republicans and Democrats.”). That commission’s report discusses a “breakdown in law
enforcement” in police and military responses. The report, however, discusses no other criminal
justice issues and makes no recommendations. SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE
PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: THE
FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION
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hand, it is heartening that the Department of Justice assembled a
group that has issued comprehensive recommendations regarding the
central problem of funding and design of a sound public defender’s
261
office in New Orleans. Failures along lines familiar since the 1960s
suggest the need to again study and address criminal justice
administration during emergencies.
B. Toward Emergency Courts
When an emergency threatens physical safety, criminal justice
institutions take on heightened importance. Criminal justice actors
share an important role in maintaining calm and order during
emergencies. During the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, far from
presenting a deliberative well-planned response, all actors remained
in disarray. Below we indicate ways that criminal justice institutions
could better coordinate during crises.
Legislation in Louisiana adopted a scheme in which a central
court receives administrative authority in times of emergency. The
Louisiana Legislature in effect codified the governor’s and the state
supreme court’s suspension of habeas corpus, stating that in future
“emergencies and disasters of unprecedented size and destructiveness
resulting from terrorist events, enemy attack, sabotage, or other
hostile action, or from fire, flood, earthquake, or other natural or
manmade causes,”262 once the governor issues an “emergency order”
all state speedy trial requirements and other deadlines will be
suspended for ninety days, and the supreme court may extend the
suspension upon a determination that it is “necessary.”263 The law also
creates “emergency sessions” for courts, so that where courts are
damaged and closed, the default venue for prisoners in detention
would be transferred to Baton Rouge (or if Baton Rouge is affected,
another unaffected jurisdiction).264 As a result, during future
emergencies courts will (1) consolidate criminal cases in a district
unaffected, and (2) delay resolution of criminal cases.
The Louisiana Legislature realized that emergencies make
criminal justice a shared concern, with prisoners transferred
FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 241 (2006), available at http://katrina.house.gov/
full_katrina_report.htm.
261. See CHIARKIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 9–16 (reporting the group’s recommendations).
262. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 941(1) (2005).
263. Id. art. 955(A)–(C).
264. Id. art. 944, 945(B).
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throughout the state. Establishing a trained, prepared default court
could avoid future confusion about jurisdiction and authority during
an emergency. Nevertheless, that “emergency session” serves only as
a default court. The legislature did not take any steps to ensure that it
was a trained default actor, or even an actor with resources to cope
with emergencies. Nor did the legislature task the “emergency
session” with any planning role that might prepare it for future
emergencies. Nor do other states have criminal justice institutions
designed to take on such an emergency planning role.265
Suppose states create institutions designed to permanently plan
and prepare for judicial administration during times of emergency—
emergency courts. Emergency courts would be tasked not just with
calling sessions in an unaffected area, but also with handling the
coordination issues that were not performed after Katrina. That is,
emergency courts could provide a clearinghouse for such subjects as
planning for transfer of prisoners; tracking and making public
updated contact information for defense attorneys and prosecutors;
making public lists of prisoners and where they are located;
monitoring hearings; ensuring adequate indigent defense; ensuring
court deadlines are complied with; safeguarding records and
evidence; and supervising efforts to locate witnesses and evidence.
Given the Louisiana courts’ failure to respond to the emergency,
it may seem surprising to focus on courts as exercising a future
leadership role. Yet despite their relative lack of power as compared
with the political branches, courts provide a natural center for
planning to prevent criminal justice collapse and for decisionmaking
to maintain the integrity of the criminal process during times of
emergency. Courts are the “executive” within the criminal system,
with authority to supervise operation of court facilities, correctional
facilities, and prosecutors and defense lawyers appearing before

265. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1063(1) (2005) (permitting a judge to declare a
mistrial if “[i]t is impossible for the trial to proceed in conformity with law . . . ,” but refusing to
provide for an emergency court). The New York state courts developed novel procedures to
restore administration of justice “surprisingly quickly,” without even a two week delay, and in a
manner sensitive to individual rights after September 11, 2001, according to a report by the
VERA institute. See OREN ROOT, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER EMERGENCY
CONDITIONS: LESSONS FOLLOWING THE ATTACK ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER (2002),
http://www.vera.org/publications/publications_2c.asp?section_id=16&project_id=&sub_section_
id=5&publication_id=148&publication_content_id=210.
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266
them, as well as to consolidate cases to examine systemic issues
affecting their jurisdiction.267 Courts thus may have the best “on the
ground” information about problems in administering criminal
justice.
Courts could maintain the legitimacy of the criminal system
during an emergency by insisting on reasonable compliance with
constitutional criminal procedure rules. For example, we argue that
unlike the Louisiana courts, an emergency court should take the
following six minimal steps:
1. Require the state corrections department and prosecutors to
make promptly available names and locations of all inmates
to defense counsel and families;
2. Conduct prompt triage hearings to release non-felony
offenders, for whom due process should prevent indefinite
detention, and waive or reduce statutory bail;
3. For more serious offenses, insist that prompt hearings be
held in which prosecutors decide whether to charge or accept
guilty pleas with probation (to be supervised for evacuees in
their new homes);
4. Ensure full access to counsel at detention facilities;
5. Conduct prompt hearings to ascertain adequacy of indigent
defense counsel, solicit volunteer counsel if there is a
shortage of local counsel, and evaluate the institutional
adequacy of the indigent defense office;
6. Insist on compliance with charge deadlines and speedy-trial
deadlines, and if there is no compliance, entertain writs of
habeas corpus—with priority for misdemeanor detainees.

An emergency court should develop further emergency response
procedures to the range of post-Katrina failures; our outline above

266. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (“Certain
implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice . . . .”); see generally Garrett,
supra note 8. Criminal justice actors come from multiple branches of government, each
answering to different authorities and constituencies. A crisis can make it impossible to
reassemble in one place all of the necessary players. Advance emergency planning becomes
crucial for such a necessarily decentralized system, and courts are natural conveners of that
planning.
267.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that consolidation of cases falls within
“implied powers” of courts. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (“[T]he power to
stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of
the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants.”).
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addresses only some of the glaring constitutional violations tolerated
for many months without even investigative hearings by the
268
Louisiana courts.
Additional advance planning should involve prosecutors, defense
counsel, and law enforcement. The court ideally would continue to
evaluate emergency criminal justice needs and then seek to raise
baseline levels of resources in the criminal system. For example, the
New Orleans courts have pressed a reevaluation of the indigent
defense office in New Orleans, which, based on the Department of
Justice’s recommendations, may finally lead to a constitutionally
adequate system. A focus on emergency needs may force other
jurisdictions to reassess, before a crisis occurs, the costs of neglecting
already borderline-constitutional indigent defense systems.
C. Collaborative Criminal Justice
Certain tasks might not be effectively handled by an emergency
court alone. The court system has little to say about operation of the
local police department, which must conduct its own emergency
planning and preparations. Nor can the state courts convene outside
state and federal assistance for local agencies. Problems of
coordination between states and with the federal government call for
added mutual assistance and collaboration regarding criminal justice
emergencies. Existing mutual aid programs coordinate only the
provision of law enforcement and National Guard troops.269
Coordinated mutual assistance operations could extend to emergency
courts, prosecution resources, defense resources, and correctional
facilities. They could create opportunities for learning and

268. Local elected judges may be particularly unwilling to carry out threats to release
prisoners whose constitutional rights have been violated. Perhaps judges appointed to an ad hoc
emergency court would be more willing than elected local judges to enforce compliance.
269. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) provides for law
enforcement assistance, but not other criminal justice support. See generally EMERGENCY
MGMT. ASSISTANCE COMPACT, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT, available
at http://www.emacweb.org/?564. The Select Committee Report describes its response postKatrina as disorganized. See SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 260, at 250–51 (“EMAC officials have
acknowledged a significant population of ‘self-deployed’ personnel . . . . Due to the ad hoc
nature of these ‘self-deployed’ officers, specific figures are not known. . . . Without an official
deployment, the ‘self-deployed’ personnel were acting without proper authority, without
liability protection, and without eligibility for expense reimbursement.”).
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collaboration between state and local law enforcement across state
lines and establish new baseline resources levels.
The federal government could act as a center for such efforts. A
federal agency could, upon the request of state or local government,
establish an emergency court to resume administration of criminal
270
justice. The authorizing federal statute could require state consent,
but also require that the federal emergency court involve (to the
extent possible) local judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers
familiar with state law, or actors from nearby unaffected cities or
states. Less intrusively, a federal agency could conduct training on
operation of criminal justice during emergencies and supervise
planning efforts. Further, financial assistance to maintain the basic
operations of local criminal justice systems may be critical,
particularly during the initial recovery period after an emergency.
Perhaps new collaboration in emergency planning and assistance
could counter the fragmented structure that contributed to the
vulnerability of the Louisiana criminal justice system.
CONCLUSION
One Louisiana criminal defense lawyer expressed hope that
“[w]e may see some lasting reform out of this tragedy. We have a
criminal justice system that in some ways was already in crisis, and
this could allow us to address those issues.”271 So far, the state
legislative response merely centralized judicial emergency authority
to suspend court deadlines. The federal government provided military
assistance of limited use, and almost no criminal justice assistance.
Meanwhile, the local police department all but dissolved. The local
court system failed to resolve cases of thousands detained, and
tolerated a range of constitutional violations and a defunct indigent
defense system. Appellate courts largely failed to intervene, and in
effect suspended the Constitution for months.

270. Perhaps a non-Article III court could be created by Congress, such as an Article I
tribunal with administrative law judges that could handle state prosecutions. See N. Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 (1982) (plurality opinion) (“[T]his Court
has identified three situations [territorial courts, courts to establish and administer courtsmartial, and courts to adjudicate cases involving ‘public rights’] in which Art. III does not bar
the creation of legislative courts.”); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and
the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643 (2004) (discussing Congress’s
power to create Article I tribunals). Alternatively, the federal emergency court could merely
create infrastructure for state actors to maintain criminal adjudication.
271. King, supra note 207, at 11.
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The end of the story is not in sight. More than a year after
Hurricane Katrina, people remain in detention, facing charges, and
uncompensated, and the system has not yet developed a plan to avoid
future mass constitutional violations and disorder or to provide
meaningful indigent criminal defense representation. Criminal
procedure rules did not serve their intended roles after Katrina to
protect individual liberties because the institutions of justice
collapsed. Local judges, public defenders, prosecutors and police
failed to intervene, even after months passed and they began to
resume their work. Nor did the state or federal government provide
timely or sufficient assistance. The individuals most affected were
largely indigent, but also usually arrested for petty crimes for which
they never had a hearing or a chance to pay bail to secure their
release.
These failures that lingered long after the hurricane were not
surprising given the persistent inability of local criminal justice actors
to address their own vulnerability during emergencies, particularly
where doing so required allocating scant resources for unpopular
causes such as indigent criminal defense. By shedding light on the
nature and vast scope of criminal justice collapse after Hurricane
Katrina in New Orleans, we have shown how criminal justice actors
can benefit from rethinking their institutional preparedness. We
propose the creation of emergency courts as one mechanism to
ensure criminal procedure rules are followed to the extent possible, to
coordinate and plan for responses during emergencies, and to obtain
state and federal collaboration and resources. If governments do not
commit to secure the basic operation of the criminal process during
emergencies, the same fault lines may result in another entirely
predictable criminal system collapse.

